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vPreface
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty, the European 
Space Policy Institute (ESPI), the Space Generation Advisory Council (SGAC) and 
the German Aerospace Center (DLR) invited students and young professionals 
globally to submit a paper which offers a fresh approach on the Outer Space Treaty.
The aim of this competition was to draw up a paper with a new legal view on the 
Outer Space Treaty. As such, the paper neither aims to discuss the history of the 
Outer Space Treaty nor to question current or ambiguous legal obligations under the 
Outer Space Treaty. Rather, it ambitions to provide an actual approach on the Outer 
Space Treaty, proposing new legal obligations that could be included, solutions to 
overcome diverging interpretations of current legal obligations or solutions that fill 
a void in the existing legal regulations of the Outer Space Treaty. Nevertheless, this 
should not be limited to an interpretation or perspective in the interest of one or a 
minority of states. Any new legal obligation or solution shall account for the needs 
and interests of the whole international community and thus should be able to gain 
the acceptance of said whole international community. Moreover, the point was to 
focus on one issue at a time, rather than trying to discuss a number of issues, allow-
ing thus to adhere to the word limit while still offering an in-depth study. Beyond 
this limitation, authors were free to choose their subject, although they were encour-
aged to choose a unique and novel subject.
This essay competition was set up to give a voice to the next generation in the 
international space community by providing them fruitful scientific research experi-
ence. At a later stage, selected papers will be used as working material to support the 
discussion of the 16th Space Generation Congress Working Group titled “Outer 
Space Treaty: The Next Fifty Years”.
annette.froehlich@espi.or.at
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Executive Summary
The Global Space Law Essay Competition was set up to give students and young 
professionals globally a possibility to contribute to the ongoing reflections on the 
Outer Space Treaty (OST). On the occasion of the 50th anniversary, it should not 
only be to look back to its achievements in the last five decades but also to analyse 
what should be included in the OST to make this treaty better adapted for upcoming 
space endeavours.
Generally, the ongoing discussions of the space law community are turning 
around the legality of space resources mining, space traffic managing or the inclu-
sion of the private sector in space. Instead the invited young persons opted more in 
favour of topics around environmental protection and how to seize the questions of 
militarization and the peaceful use of outer space. Others, aware that new social 
questions may arise, advocate for new perceptions, definitions and governance sys-
tems to embrace upcoming aspects of future settlements in space in order to avoid 
former colonialist mistakes.
Therefore, it is very instructive to have a glance at space topics which should be 
comprised by the Outer Space Treaty so that space activities and the use of outer 
space may be ensured for the next decades.
Environmental issues are a topic of high priority, and several aspects were anal-
ysed from different angles. At the time of the drafting of the OST, its purpose was 
to avoid a space race or any kind of military conflict. As environmental issues were 
not in the focus of the authors of this treaty, effective environmental protection pro-
visions were not formulated and included in the OST. Influenced by newer interna-
tional aspirations to protect the environment on Earth, it is considered wise to 
include the achieved common understandings and principles for the benefit of 
earthly environment protection as well in the Outer Space Treaty. Meanwhile, the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development has generated principles, which 
may also account for the outer space environment to foster its sustainable develop-
ment. Therefore, a transfer of the Rio Principles on Environmental Protection in the 
OST is proposed. Even if this Rio Declaration is not legally binding, its fundamen-
tal principles were adopted by consensus. This is particularly the case for the 
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provisions establishing mutual obligation in respect to information, notification and 
consultation and the “Precautionary Principle” including a reverse burden of proof. 
For outer space, this would mean that the operators in space would have to prove 
that their activities have no harmful effect on the space environment. Since space 
activities are hazardous and their influence on environment may be uncertain, it is 
proposed that this absolute reverse burden of proof only comes to effect in case of a 
“prima facie evidence of risks”.1
Moreover, in the field of protection of the environment, unresolved aspects 
around the international responsibility arising from pollution should be analysed 
furthermore. Even if the current international space regulations do not provide rules 
for it, new regulations may be inspired by the general principles of international law 
on states’ responsibility for wrongful acts.2
Another pivotal question turns around the topic of how to maintain peace in an 
environment which is highly demanded not only for its resources but also for its 
strategic positioning for space-based infrastructure. How may the deliberated 
destruction of a satellite of another state be thus considered in the frame of the inter-
national concept of threat to the peace or breach of the peace? In addition, the debris 
emanating from such an intentional destruction of a satellite may endanger there-
upon also the peaceful use of outer space.3 Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty seems 
not to be adequately adapted to the ongoing peacekeeping mission of the United 
Nations as Art. IV OST contains some ambiguities. From one side, the use of mili-
tary personnel for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose shall not be 
prohibited (provision which advocates for a possible intervention of UN peacekeep-
ers in outer space), but from another side, establishment of military bases and instal-
lations is forbidden by the same Art. IV OST. Therefore it seems that the OST turns 
UN peacekeeping missions in outer space impossible as those kinds of operations 
need usually a headquarters support unit in situ. In consequence, a rephrasing of this 
article should be envisaged to ensure that a UN peacekeeping operation in outer 
space may be possible in case of threat emanating from futuristic threatening sce-
narios and actions.4 As already mentioned, the OST was developed to avoid any 
military conflicts in space; nevertheless, this aspect keeps remaining. Indeed, the 
question of how space can remain out of military aspirations is still of utmost impor-
tance as most of space operations are or can be perceived and employed in its dual- 
use capacity. Moreover, the unshielded satellites are considered as soft targets, easy 
1 Rf. Gordon Chung, The Emerging of Environmental Protection Clauses in the Outer Space 
Treaty: A Lesson from the Rio Principles, p. 1.
2 Rf. Giulia Pavesi, Legal Consequences of Environmental Pollution in Outer Space, p. 15.
3 Rf. Alexander Gairiseb, Intentional Destruction of Satellites in Relation to International Peace 
and Security, p. 31.
4 Rf. Eduardo Bressel Baratto, Peacekeeping Operations in Outer Space: Contradictions in Article 
IV of the Outer Space Treaty, p. 39.
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to track due to their predictable orbits. In consequence, this exposes them in such a 
way that critical infrastructure of spacefaring nations may be at risk.5
Considering our further stay in space, the OST should also take into account new 
settlements by humans in space, i.e. on other celestial bodies. In addition, the pri-
mary intention of the OST was to avoid the possibility to claim resources as this was 
considered as a source of conflicts. This would then raise the question of how to 
start new human settlements without the possibility of a certain national appropria-
tion. To solve this ambiguity, a change in humanity’s legal perspective of the uni-
verse is suggested which guides also to a change of interpretation of the OST and 
outer space. The OST itself always stipulates that outer space is “including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies”. This leads to the conclusion that Earth is exospa-
tial and to the fact that the non-appropriation principle does not apply to Earth, but 
to all outer space (including Moon and other celestial bodies). Therefore it is advo-
cated for a new definition. Accordingly, outer space is “the space outside of a celes-
tial body’s gravity well relative to a state’s presence and perspective on that particular 
celestial body”. Moreover, the non-appropriation principle should be applicable for 
any celestial body in the universe outside of the gravity well of the celestial body on 
which the nation exists. However, in order to avoid a non-appropriation of celestial 
bodies such as asteroids (in order to exploit their resources), it is proposed that 
celestial bodies with minimal gravity wells are exempt of this non-appropriation 
principle. Concerning the moons, it is suggested that a decision should be taken on 
a political level due to the various types of moons and the fact that they have gravity 
wells of their own and are situated within the overall gravity well of their parent 
planets.6
Additionally, it is not only interesting to see how the Outer Space Treaty influ-
ences the rights and responsibilities of humans and robots in today’s law but also 
how this may influence and provoke changes in international regulations in the 
future. Reflections are undertaken to consider including an appropriate section of 
robotic law in the OST in order to take into account the fact that some nations con-
sider giving “personhood” status to robots. Nevertheless, a change of the OST in 
this perspective should also reflect the different level of digital development of its 
state parties.7
Finally, it is also expected from the OST to balance the ambitions of the private 
sector and the sovereignty of nations. Therefore, the OST should include principles 
of governance. Different (classic and emerging) models of institutionalized space 
governance may be feasible. However, following classic models, the legitimacy 
derives from elections. Nevertheless, in most specialized space institutions, experts 
5 Rf. Matteo Frigoli, Wild Military Operations in Space: A Sword of Damocles Hanging over 
Future of Space Environment and Space Activities, p. 49.
6 Rf. Zach Miller, Space Settlement and the Celestial Subjectivity Model: Shifting Our Legal 
Perspective of the Universe, p. 59.
7 Rf. Maria Baczyńska-Wilkowska, Outer Space Treaty During Fourth Industrial Revolution, p. 67.
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xare appointed. Moreover, the OST should foresee the possibility to install a spe-
cialized supranational judicial body equipped with a sufficient flexible method 
allowing to create standards to accommodate the evolutions of space technologies 
and activities. In this regard, not only states but also private actors in space should 
be entitled to appeal to this court. Furthermore, the model “law without states” is 
analysed as a possible concept for space governance considering that more and 
more private initiatives are carried out in space and that states are no longer the 
only actors in space.8
8 Rf. Valentin Degrange, Into the Twenty-First Century: Integration of Principles of Global 
Governance in Space Law, p. 75.
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Chapter 1
Emergence of Environmental Protection 
Clauses in Outer Space Treaty: A Lesson 
from the Rio Principles
Gordon Chung
Abstract Today, the virtually unrestricted exploration and use of outer space gives 
birth to the increasingly severe problem of extra-terrestrial pollution that merits 
special attention. Under the present Outer Space Treaty (OST) regime, while Article 
IX calls for the avoidance of harmful contamination in space and the need for inter-
national consultations, it is ineffective as an environmental protection provision, 
primarily due to the absence of more rigorous environmental standards governing 
space activities and the inherent uncertainties associated with its applicability. 
Notably, for reformatory purpose, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development has significant referential value for formulating environmental regula-
tions in space law as it embodies various fundamental principles of environmental 
law and represents the first international document of ‘constitutional dimension’ to 
read those environmental principles through the lens of sustainable development. 
Accordingly, to facilitate the sustainable, progressive development of the outer 
space, this article proposes that the existing OST regime should be reformed along 
two major lines: (1) the incorporation of the ‘environmental consultation’ clauses 
under Principles 18 and 19 of the Rio Declaration into the Treaty and (2) the appli-
cation of the precautionary principle enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
to the outer space context.
1.1  Introduction
Generally speaking, pollution refers to ‘a modification on the environment through 
human agency by the introduction on undesirable elements or by the undesirable 
use of elements’.1 Today, extra-terrestrial pollution deserves particular attention and 
1 I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, ‘Environmental Protection in Outer Space’ (1987) 30 German 
Y.B. Int’l L. 144, 144.
G. Chung (*) 
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2is increasingly attributable to a variety of sources, including space debris, chemical 
effluents, biological contamination and radioactive waste.2 The reason why the 
outer space environment merits special protection is that it constitutes an indirect 
part of the human ecological sphere, dubbed as a ‘para-environment’.3 In fact, outer 
space is an extremely fragile environment that does not allow any mistakes to be 
made.4 And, what is more important, the unrestricted spoilage of this pristine envi-
ronment will inevitably hinder the future exploration and use of, and endanger free 
access to, outer space at the complete expense of the interests of all non-space- 
faring nations.5 The environmental issues in outer space, therefore, deserve closer 
examination, particularly in view of the immature development of environment- 
friendly space technology and practice in the modern space sector.6
Throughout the current Outer Space Treaty (OST) regime, Article IX represents 
the most fundamental – if not the only – provision in space law for protection of the 
outer space environment and its preservation for peaceful uses.7 It imposes a duty on 
States to exercise ‘due regard’ for the interests of other countries when conducting 
any space activity8 – known as the ‘due regard’ principle.9 More specifically, this 
provision attempts to tackle the environmental issues in space, by creating a ‘pro-
scriptive positive legal obligation’10 for all States to (1) avoid harmful contamina-
tion of celestial bodies and (2) undertake international consultations in advance 
before any potentially harmful interference may arise from their activities.11 
However, in light of the impotence and inherent vagueness of Article IX as well as 
the inevitable need for harmonisation of international environmental law and space 
law, this analysis argues for the incorporation of the ‘environmental consultation’ 
clauses and the precautionary principle into the existing OST regime with reference 
to the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) 
and with a view to fostering the sustainable development of space activities.
2 Stephen Gorove, ‘Pollution and Outer Space: A Legal Analysis and Appraisal’ (1972) 5 New York 
Journal of International Law and Policy, 55.
3 Saara Reiman, ‘Is Space an Environment?’ (2009) Space Policy 25, 81–87.
4 Paul B Larsen, ‘Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon’ (2006) 71 J. Air L. & 
Com. 295, 298.
5 Lotta Viikari, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the 
Future (Brill/Nijhoff 2008) 147.
6 Ibid. 147.
7 Sergio Marchisio, ‘Article IX’ in Stephan Hobe and others (eds.), I Cologne Commentary On 
Space Law (Carl Heymanns 2009) 176.
8 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1967, art IX.
9 Michael C Mineiro, ‘FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT intercepts: An Assessment of Legal Obligations 
Under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty’ (2008) 34 J. Space L. 321, 333.
10 Ibid. 332–333.
11 OST, art IX.
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31.2  Current OST Regime: Continued Absence of Effective 
Environmental Protection Provisions
Notably, a close reading of the principles enshrined in Article IX reveals that they 
gear towards the protection of human beings rather than the attainment of environ-
mental protection as an end in itself.12 In fact, space law scholars have long regarded 
Article IX as an impotent provision because it fails to set standards in the field of the 
space environment or, at a minimum, entrusts a regulatory body to do so.13 
Furthermore, commentators have been very consistent in their view that Article IX, 
as far as its legal nature is concerned, has not evolved into customary law.14 Hence, 
to what extent can this flawed provision effectively address the increasing environ-
mental concerns in outer space?
1.2.1  ‘Harmful Contamination’ Clause: Limited Coverage
As a starting point, Article IX of the OST explicitly provides that States must avoid 
‘harmful contamination’ to the outer space environment.15 That being said, since the 
‘harmful contamination’ clause aims not to safeguard the space environment per se 
but primarily to further scientific utility, the threshold for pollution should be set 
relatively high.16 In particular, the narrow applicability of this clause is evident from 
its express confinement to the ‘studies’ and ‘exploration’ of space.17 This termino-
logical emphasis implies that exploitative activities in outer space go beyond the 
reach of the ‘harmful contamination’ clause, especially in light of the intentional 
omission of the word ‘use’.18 Even if the ‘use’ of outer space indeed falls within the 
restriction stipulated in Article IX, the term ‘avoid’ delineates that the obligation is 
not one of absolute prevention of harm but is one of discretionary nature.19
Moreover, the expression ‘harmful contamination’ does not provide an all- 
inclusive definition encompassing all forms of harm. In space law literature, ‘harm-
ful contamination’ is variously defined as the ‘introduction of elements that make 
12 Philippe Sands and others, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn., Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 300.
13 Ruwantissa IR Abeyratne, Frontiers of Aerospace Law (Routledge 2002).
14 See Lawrence D Roberts, ‘Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris: Combining 
International Regulatory and Liability Regimes’ (1992) 15 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L.Rev. 51, 61; Bin 
Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (Clarendon Press 1997).
15 OST, art XI.
16 George T Hacket, Space Debris and the Corpus Iuris Spatialis (Gif-sur-Yvette 1992) 104.
17 Delbert D Smith, ‘The Technical, Legal and Business Risks of Orbital Debris’ (1997) 6 
N.Y.U. Envt’l. L.J. 50, 56.
18 Ibid.; Maureen Williams, ‘Dispute Resolution Regarding Space Activities’ in Frans von der 
Dunk (ed), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 1001.
19 Mineiro (n 9) 340.
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4outer space unfit for use’,20 or as the ‘intentional introduction of strange items and 
substance into outer space’.21 Yet, despite its apparently broad formulation, the 
clause focuses primarily on the release of harmful microbiological organisms of 
terrestrial origin from any accidental collision or explosion in outer space, and it is 
questionable whether or not the definition extends to include all other sources of 
environmental harm such as orbital debris (which should preferably be described as 
‘space object’).22 In any event, States are granted a wide discretion to determine 
what measure constitutes ‘appropriate’23 to avoid harmful contamination, and this 
part of Article IX is certainly devoid of practical significance.24
1.2.2  ‘International Consultation’ Clause: Vague Threshold 
of Harm
Further, Article IX requires a State to undertake ‘international consultations’ before 
proceeding with any space activity that it has ‘reason to believe’ would cause 
‘potentially harmful interference’.25 This procedural requirement, as a specification 
of ‘appropriate measures’ envisaged in Article IX, was in fact outgrown from the 
‘due regard’ principle and the ‘harmful contamination’ clause.26 However, without 
an express mention of the protection of the extra-terrestrial environment, the ‘inter-
national consultation’ clause seems to place exclusive emphasis on the ‘mutual 
respect for national interests’.27 Therefore, the consultation clause is not construed 
as protecting the outer space environment per se but rather as safeguarding the space 
activities of all States.28
First and foremost, an essential criterion of the applicability of the consultation 
clause is the occurrence of ‘potentially harmful interference’.29 It is noteworthy that 
the expression ‘harmful interference’ is interpreted to cover three main types of 
harm: (1) observational interference, (2) radio-frequency interference and (3) physi-
cal interference.30 Accordingly, it seems that adverse environmental effects do not 
strictly fall within the intended meaning of ‘harmful interference’ unless they are 
20 Ibid. 339.
21 YM Kolossov, ‘Legal Aspects of Outer Space Environmental Protection’ (1980) 23 I.I.S.L. PROC. 
103, 103.
22 Howard A Baker, Debris and Policy Implications (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 103.
23 OST, art IX.
24 Mineiro (n 9) 340.
25 OST, art IX.
26 Jerzy Sztucki, ‘International Consultations and Space Treaties’ (1974) 17 Colloquium L Outer 
Space 147, 157.
27 Hacket (n 16) 122.
28 Lotta Viikari, ‘Environmental Aspects of Space Activities’ in (n 18) 730.
29 Sztucki (n 26) 157; Mineiro (n 9).
30 Mineiro (n 9) 337.
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5capable of restricting the physical movement or interfering with the physical opera-
tions in outer space – thus possibly amounting to ‘physical interference’. Yet, even if 
this is the case, it then prompts the question of whether, as long as the space activities 
of another State are interfered by the environmental effects inflicted by a State, how-
ever trivial they seem to be, the duty to consult under Article IX is triggered. Where 
and how can we draw the line? It appears that the language of ‘potentially harmful 
interference’ does an ineffective job in indicating a proper threshold of harm.
The second question concerns the difficulty of establishing the relevant ‘harm’ 
threshold under the OST, which gives no further guidance on this issue.31 
Commentators have been quite consistent in their view that a predominantly subjec-
tive test is implied in Article IX for deciding whether or not a ‘reason to believe’ 
exists.32 The terminology of the consultation clause, on its face, allows States to 
retain a ‘wide degree of latitude’ in determining whether or not the implementation 
of consultative engagement is due.33 More importantly, such consultations are 
devoid of practical value unless an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)  – 
which is not a well-established tool in the international law of outer space – is car-
ried out. Therefore, in reality, the ‘international consultation’ clause rarely acts as a 
procedural bar to any environmentally harmful activity in outer space. Even though 
the potentially affected States have the right to request appropriate consultation,34 
there is no compulsory obligation to act upon their recommendations.35
1.3  Transplantation of Rio Principles on Environmental 
Protection: Sustainable Development of Outer Space
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is reasonable to say that the existing OST regime 
fails to offer a comprehensive legal framework that safeguards the outer space envi-
ronment and to establish more rigorous environmental standards governing the con-
duct of space activities.36 Given that space activities evolve with their ‘characteristic 
rapidity’, there is a pressing need for employing international law to address their 
ongoing environmental issues.37 This is especially so when one considers the fact 
that international law has placed undue emphasis on the fundamentality of 
31 Viikari (n 5) 176.
32 Sztucki (n 26) 164; Hacket (n 16) 124.
33 Ibid.; Mineiro (n 9) 338.
34 OST, art IX.
35 I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor and Vladimír Kopal, An Introduction To Space Law (3rd ed., 
Kluwer Law International 2008) 125.
36 Shawkat Alam and others (eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(Routledge 2013) 390.
37 See Abeyratne (n 13).
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6environmental protection.38 For reformatory purpose, the principles of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration, standing as a radical and inspirational pronouncement from 172 States, 
deserve particular attention. Although the Rio Declaration is not legally binding or 
a constitutional instrument in its strict sense, it should be seen as possessing a con-
stitutional dimension since it is the only international instrument adopted by con-
sensus that conciliates the most fundamental principles of international 
environmental law with socio-economic development.39 Today, a number of interna-
tional treaties40 and States41 consistently endorse and refer to the basic principles 
enshrined in the Rio Declaration. Accordingly, incorporating some of these princi-
ples into the present OST regime can more likely foster the progressive develop-
ment of environmental law in outer space.42
1.3.1  Procedural Safeguard: Implementation 
of ‘Environmental Consultation’ Clauses
The mutual obligations of States concerning information and notification in 
Principles 18 and 19 of the Rio Declaration, unlike the ‘international consultation’ 
clause under Article IX, are procedural elements of sustainable development recog-
nised in customary international law.43 It follows that any violation of these two 
principles will constitute international wrongful acts and thereby result in the cessa-
tion of environmentally destructive activities.44 Notably, these two principles can 
serve as the ‘model’ provisions for space law scholars to construe more effective 
‘environmental consultation’ clauses in compensation for the inherent ambiguities 
associated with the existing consultation clause in the OST.
38 Owen McIntyre and Thomas Mosedale, ‘The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary 
International Law’ (1997) 9 J. Envtl. L. 221, 221.
39 Jorge E Viñuales, ‘Preliminary Study’ in Jorge E Viñuales (ed.), The Rio Declaration On 
Environment And Development: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015) 1, 60 (emphasis 
added).
40 See Viikari (n 5) 128; Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 1997 (U.N. Watercourses Convention), Preamble.
41 Sumudu Atapattu, ‘International Environmental Law and Soft Law: A New Direction or A 
Contradiction?’ in Cecilia M. Bailliet (ed), Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes: 
From the Margins (Cambridge University Press 2012) 209.
42 Viikari (n 5) 128.
43 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (Taylor & Francis 2002) 
251; L Boisson De Chazournes and K Sangbana, ‘Principle 19’ in (n 39) 502; Phoebe Okowa, 
‘Principle 18’ in (n 39) 479–80; Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 
(Manchester University Press 1995) 606–607.
44 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France) (1990) 82 ILR 499, 573, para 114.
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71.3.1.1  Prior Notification and Consultation
To begin with, Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration, in essence, serves as a prelimi-
nary procedural hurdle, by mandating that States must give ‘prior and timely notifi-
cation and relevant information’ to potentially affected States on activities that may 
have a ‘significant adverse transboundary environmental effect’ and must ‘consult 
with those States at an early stage in good faith’.45 The necessity of notification and 
consultation, particularly in the context of protecting a pristine environment with 
shared natural resources, is early reflected in the Corfu Channel case,46 widely rec-
ognised by the international tribunal,47 and well established in a range of interna-
tional instruments.48 Notably, the ‘harm test’ under international environmental law 
is less subjective than, and differs substantially from, the ‘test for reasonable belief’ 
under Article IX. The triggering condition for Principle 19, if applied directly to the 
extra-terrestrial context, is establishing the existence of outer space activities that 
have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect.49 This condition first 
begs the question of whether transboundary harm, which seemingly presupposes an 
assertion of territorial claim in breach of the non-appropriation principle, can actu-
ally exist in outer space. In fact, the International Law Commission (ILC) has 
adopted such a flexible interpretation of the term ‘transboundary’ that it is not lim-
ited exclusively to the ‘territory’ of a State but extends to cover any places over 
which a State exercises ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘control’.50 As a State can, by virtue of 
Article VIII of the OST, be legitimately granted the ‘jurisdiction and control’ over 
its space object(s) and facilities for an indeterminate period of time,51 the ILC defi-
nition of ‘transboundary’ appears to accommodate the impossibility of delimiting 
any space territory among nations and is thus applicable to the outer space.
As far as the extent of harm is concerned, although international law does not 
strictly define the ‘gravity threshold’ that requires notification to take place,52 the 
alleged ‘transboundary environmental effect’ must reach a certain level of gravity.53 
According to the ILC, the word ‘significant’ is interpreted to mean ‘something more 
45 Rio Declaration, Principle 19.
46 Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) (Judgment) [1949] ICJ Rep 4. See also ILC Prevention articles 
with Commentaries, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 148, U.N. Doc. A/C.N.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 
(Part 2), art 8, 159, para 3.
47 See Land Reclamation by in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v Singapore) (Provisional 
Measures) [2003] ITLOS Reports, 10, para 106; MOX Plant (Ireland v UK) (Provisional Measures) 
[2001] ITLOS Reports, 95, para 89.
48 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 1993, art 
21(1); Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 1979, art 5.
49 RD Munro and JG Lammers, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal 
Principles and Recommendations (Springer 1987) 104–105.
50 ILC Prevention articles with Commentaries (n 46), art 2(c).
51 OST, art VIII.
52 Chazournes and Sangbana (n 43) 496.
53 Ibid.
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8than “detectable” but which need not rise to the level of “serious” or “substantial”’.54 
Notably, this ILC definition mirrors what commentators call the ‘de minimis test’ 
under which as long as the environmental effect is not minor (either insignificant or 
trivial), the threshold is crossed.55 More importantly, the question of what environ-
mental impact is considered ‘significant’, while essentially determined by factual 
and objective criteria, also denotes a value judgement that is dependent upon the 
circumstances of each particular case.56 Hence, the ILC approach seemingly dis-
plays a dual subjective-objective standard that sounds more pragmatic and 
practicable,57 when compared with the predominantly subjective test for reasonable 
belief under Article IX. Moreover, the language of ‘significant’ has been generally 
accepted in international environmental agreements, and this qualification is con-
sidered capable of achieving a proper balance.58 At the end of the day, as a matter of 
policy, the adjudicator is also required to carry out a balancing exercise between the 
‘socio-economic utility’ of the space activity and its ‘detrimental effects’ on the 
pristine space environment, thus being compatible with the principles of equity and 
fairness firmly rooted in international law.59
Further, it is worth noting that Principle 19 constitutes a specific obligation of 
performance (obligation de faire) demanding a State to give ‘prior and timely noti-
fication’ to the potentially affected States before carrying out its activities.60 More 
specifically, the ILC defined the term ‘timely’ as ‘intended to require notification 
sufficiently early in the planning stages to permit meaningful consultations and 
negotiations’.61 Hence, the ultimate purpose of consultations is for the potentially 
affected States who object to the proposed (environmentally destructive) activities 
to seek the most ideal solutions regarding measures to be taken to eliminate the 
risk.62
54 ILC Prevention articles with Commentaries (n 46) art 2, 152, para 4 (emphasis added).
55 R Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State Liability (Kluwer 
Law International 1996) 24.
56 John G Lammers, ‘Prevention of Transboundary Harm From Hazardous Activities The ILC Draft 
Articles’ in AC Kiss and Johan G Lammers (eds.), Hague Yearbook of International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2002) 7.
57 Kevin R Gray, Cinnamon Piñon Carlarne and Richard Tarasofsky, The Oxford Handbook of 
International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 473.
58 Lammers (n 56) 7.
59 Gray, Carlarne and Tarasofsky (n 57) 473.
60 Chazournes and Sangbana (n 43) 502.
61 Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and 
Commentaries [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’L. Comm’n 89, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.493 (Part 2), art 12, para 4.
62 Chazournes and Sangbana (n 43) 500.
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91.3.1.2  Post-disaster Notification
In complementary to Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration, Principle 18 further 
imposes a mandatory obligation to ‘immediately notify other States of any natural 
disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on 
their environment’.63 This obligation of notification of emergencies, as reflected in 
a number of international instruments,64 aims at offering the potentially affected 
States an opportunity to react promptly in order to prevent or mitigate any environ-
mental damage.65
As a starting point, Principle 18 is most saliently distinguished from Principle 19 
by the nature of its triggering event. The existence of ‘natural disasters’ or ‘emer-
gencies’ triggers the duty to notify under Principle 18.66 Notably, the Draft Articles 
on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Natural Disasters67 adopted by the ILC 
in 2016 define the term ‘disaster’ as ‘a calamitous event’ resulting in ‘widespread 
loss of life, great human suffering and distress … or large-scale material or environ-
mental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society’,68 whereas 
the word ‘emergencies’ is interpreted to mean the circumstances ‘that cause, or pose 
an imminent threat of causing, serious harm’.69 Nowadays, Principle 18 is even 
extended to man-made disasters,70 and it apparently entails a higher gravity thresh-
old.71 Having said that, it is suggested that so long as the activity in question is 
intrinsically hazardous or if it is located in close proximity to an area of significant 
ecological importance, there exists a presumption of gravity.72 If this view is 
accepted, outer space activities which are in general considered par excellence 
ultrahazardous73 should be presumed to present an element of gravity and thus war-
rant notification. Applying the above analysis to hazardous space activities would 
clearly render the notification requirement an essential part of the OST regime in 
furtherance of international cooperation and the sustainable development of the 
outer space.
Second, unlike the notification required in Principle 19, the one in Principle 18 
can actually take place after the conduct of the activities and thus serve as a second 
line of procedural bar to environmentally destructive activities. While Principle 18 
63 Rio Declaration, Principle 18.
64 See Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community 
2000, art 4(5); U.N. Watercourses Convention, art 28.
65 Christina Leb, Cooperation in the Law of Transboundary Water Resources (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 126.
66 Okowa (n 43) 474.
67 Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Natural Disasters 2016, art 3(a).
68 Ibid.
69 U.N. Watercourses Convention, art 28(1).
70 Rio Declaration, Principle 18.
71 Okowa (n 43) 475.
72 Ibid.
73 Diederiks-Verschoor (n 35) 14.
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deploys a ‘narrowly circumscribed time element’ in explaining its operative scope – 
to notify other States of disasters that have just occurred – a close examination of 
the subsequent practice of States unveils that the actual duty extends to the adoption 
of preventive and mitigation strategies in the first place with a view to counteracting 
the environmental effects.74 More importantly, the terminology of Principle 18 sug-
gests that the duty to notify extends to all States that become aware of, or possess 
the relevant information on the likelihood of, an impending disaster.75 That being 
said, the responsible State is obliged to respond to specific requests for information 
from all other States.76 Failure to do so will lay the basis for questioning the bona 
fides of that State or the accuracy of its assessment of the gravity of the situation,77 
thereby in potential breach of Principle 18.
In short, one should note that clauses akin to Principles 18 and 19 of the Rio 
Declaration should be incorporated into the OST regime as they constitute a more 
environmentally centred set of provisions that entails a saliently different, but more 
balanced, gravity threshold for notification and consultation. These formulations 
can certainly provide better procedural safeguards to both space-faring and non- 
space- faring nations for the environmentally sustainable development of space 
activities.
1.3.2  Incorporation of ‘Precautionary Principle’ into OST 
Regime
While the Rio Declaration embodies various procedural requirements of environmen-
tal law, the precautionary principle, firmly enshrined in many international treaties78 
and cases,79 serves as the most vital tool to be utilised for the attainment of sustainable 
development of outer space. Specifically, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration80 high-
lights the emblematic character of the precautionary principle and has elevated it into 
customary international law,81 the breach of which will result in the cessation of activ-
ities.82 Simply put, this principle strives to avoid the occurrence of ‘serious or irrevers-
ible’83 environmental damage, by demanding States to take precautionary steps in 
74 Okowa (n 43) 478.
75 Ibid. 476.
76 Ibid. 477.
77 Ibid.
78 See Stockholm Declaration on the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1973, 
Principle 21; U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992, art 3(3).
79 Pulp Mills (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, para 205.
80 Rio Declaration, Principle 15.
81 Sands (n 43) 211–213; McIntyre and Mosedale (n 38) 224.
82 Rainbow Warrior (n 44).
83 Rio Declaration, Principle 15.
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carrying out any activity or scientific experiment.84 More notably, the precautionary 
principle encompasses the situation where ‘scientific evidence is not conclusive’85 or 
where ‘potential adverse effects [of an activity] are not fully understood’86 and thus 
finds it applicable to the outer space environment that is wrought with uncertainty. 
Although the ‘harmful contamination’ clause under Article IX kind of exemplifies the 
precautionary principle, its coverage is far from sufficient to allow extensive protec-
tion of environment. It follows that, as a general rule, a precautionary approach should 
be widely applied by all States, those space- faring nations in particular, to safeguard 
the pristine space environment, especially in view of its ultra-fragile nature. For this 
reformatory exercise, two points merit special emphasis.
First, an emerging modern view of the precautionary principle is that it should be 
utilised to impose a reverse burden of proof in order to surpass the evidentiary dif-
ficulty inherent in proving the presence of environmentally harmful activities in 
outer space. Following this progressive approach, a State interested in undertaking 
any space activity bears the onus of proving that such activities will not produce the 
adverse environmental consequences complained of.87 Its underlying rationale is 
that the author of the alleged environmental damage is invariably placed in the best 
position to produce all the relevant information on its ongoing activities.88 Yet, 
despite its apparent soundness, this tame version of precautionary principle has 
been criticised for being overly costly in the short run, and,89 more importantly, it 
ignores the practical impossibility of showing that something is completely safe in 
an environment of inherent uncertainty.90 Accordingly, instead of imposing an abso-
lute reverse burden of proof, this approach should only operate when a ‘prima facie 
evidence of risks’ has been established – a relatively low, yet acceptable, thresh-
old.91 This is particularly appropriate in relation to the space sector in which there 
are practical difficulties and particular hardships for a State in proving the harmful-
ness of the space activities of another State or in obtaining the necessary  information 
84 Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2002) 15.
85 Sonia Boutillon, ‘The Precautionary Principle: Development of an International Standard’ 
(2002) 23 Mich. J. Int’l. L 429, 432.
86 U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the World Charter for Nature 1982, para 11(b).
87 See Viikari (n 5) 176; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) (Order) [1995] ICJ 288, 348 (per 
Judge Weeramantry); Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (Order) 
[1999] ITLOS Reports, para 14 (per Judge Laing); MOX Plant (n 47) (per Judge Wolfum).
88 Ibid. 175.
89 Maurice Sunkin, Sourcebook on Environmental Law (2nd edn., Cavendish Publishing 2002) 50.
90 Annecoos Wiersema, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Governance’ in Douglas 
Fisher (ed.), Research Handbook on Fundamental Concepts of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 
Pub 2016) 459.
91 André Nollkaemper, ‘“What you risk reveals what you value”, and Other Dilemmas Encountered 
in the Legal Assaults on Risks’ in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds.), The Precautionary 
Principle and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer Law International 
1996) 86.
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exclusively controlled by the latter.92 In reality, the discretionary nature93 of Article 
XI of the OST also renders information sharing more difficult, and hence shifting 
the burden of proof in cases of prima facie evidence of risks is necessary to contrib-
ute to the objective of precaution in the outer space context.94
Second, one should note that a striking feature of the precautionary principle is 
the undertaking of a comprehensive EIA.95 Notably, the duty to undertake an EIA 
was described in the Pulp Mills case as ‘[a] requirement under general international 
law … where there is a risk that the proposed … activity may have a significant 
adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resources’.96 It 
follows that States are generally obligated to prepare an EIA in order to identify and 
assess the potential impacts of their proposed space activities that are of ultrahaz-
ardous nature. Most importantly, the development of environmental assessment sys-
tems should not be absurdly conceived as an onerous barrier to the progressive or 
commercial use of outer space. Instead, such systems can substantially minimise 
long-term costs, by dispensing with the need for deploying expensive pollution 
abatement technology or paying potentially substantive compensation for damage.97 
On balance, incorporating the precautionary principle into the present OST regime 
can better ensure the sustainable future development of space activities.
1.4  Conclusion
While extra-terrestrial pollution is an inevitable outcome of the progressive use of 
the outer space, its escalating severity deserves special attention. Yet, the unpalat-
able truth is that throughout the existing OST regime, Article IX is the sole provi-
sion that partially addresses the deep-rooted environmental concern for outer space, 
by imposing twin obligations on States, namely, the ‘harmful contamination’ clause 
and the ‘international consultation’ clause. In fact, Article IX was never intended to 
be an environmentally centred provision, and, most importantly, it fails to set more 
rigorous environmental standards to effectively govern the ever-increasing (envi-
ronmentally harmful) space activities. Therefore, in light of the ultrahazardous 
nature of space activities and the fragile extra-terrestrial environment, the present 
OST regime must be supplemented by international environmental law. It is 
92 Viikari (n 5) 176.
93 JF Mayence and Thomas Reuter, ‘Article XI’ in (n 7) 189, 197; Cheng (n 14) 403–404.
94 André Nollkaemper (n 91) 86.
95 Ellen Hey, ‘The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing 
Caution’ (1992) 4 Gielr 303, 311; Boutillon (n 85) 448. See also Rio Declaration, Principle 17.
96 Pulp Mills (n 79), para 204.
97 Lotta Viikari, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment in the Space Sector’ in CJ Bastmeijer, Timo 
Koivurova (eds.), Theory and Practice of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (Brill/
Nijhoff 2007) 285; D Owen Harrop and J Ashley Nixon, Environment Assessment in Practice 
(Routledge 1999) 9.
G. Chung
annette.froehlich@espi.or.at
13
noteworthy that the 1992 Rio Declaration, having what commentators call a ‘consti-
tutional dimension’, is highly essential to this reformatory exercise.
Specifically, Principles 18 and 19 of the Rio Declaration require a State to notify 
and consult other States both before and after carrying out any environmentally 
harmful activities. Such ‘environmental consultation’ clauses should be deployed in 
the field of space environment as they can establish more reliable gravity threshold 
that is able to achieve proper balance in compensation for the vagueness inherent in 
the ‘international consultation’ clause under Article IX. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the precautionary principle enshrined in Principles 15 of the Rio Declaration, 
while being partially exemplified by the ‘harmful contamination’ clause under 
Article IX, should be more fully incorporated into the present OST regime. 
Particularly in the outer space context, due to the practical difficulty in obtaining 
information about the ongoing space activities of another State, there should be a 
reverse burden of proof when a prima facie evidence of risks is established. Further, 
under the precautionary principle, States are generally obliged to conduct a compre-
hensive EIA to avert harm to the pristine space environment. In the long run, the 
establishment of environmental assessment systems can not only contribute to the 
protection of the space environment but also significantly minimise the costs of 
space activities arising out of extra-terrestrial pollution. Accordingly, the existing 
OST should be reformed along the lines of the Rio Declaration to facilitate the sus-
tainable development of outer space.
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Chapter 2
Legal Consequences of Environmental 
Pollution in Outer Space
Giulia Pavesi
Abstract If there was full acceptance of the school of thought which recognises as 
international customary law the obligation to prevent outer space from harmful con-
tamination and to pursue activities in outer space with due diligence, as crystallised 
by Articles I and IX of the Outer Space Treaty, then it will become necessary to 
investigate what will be the consequences of a breach of such an international cus-
tomary rule of law.
The present discussion will move in this investigation, considering mainly the 
international responsibility arising from pollution per se, regardless of whether the 
damage occurred or not, particularly focusing on Article VI of the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty.
Since international space law does not provide any secondary rule which specifi-
cally regulate the legal consequences of environmental pollution of outer space as 
such, these provisions will be inferred from the general principles of international 
law on States responsibility for wrongful acts.
As a matter of fact, if no international responsibility regime is predicted against 
space pollution per se, the outer space environment would be left completely unde-
fended, opening the road for a totally irresponsible exploitation. In this sense, the 
international responsibility might be considered as a deterrent against such an atti-
tude, indirectly leading space exploration and exploitation towards prevention and 
sustainability for the future generations.
In other words, paraphrasing Judge Max Huber’s observations in the Spanish 
Zone of Morocco Claims case, international responsibility for the wrongful act of 
space pollution should be the necessary corollary of the right of free use and access 
to outer space on an equitable basis.
Finally, such a responsibility should result in the duty to make reparation for the 
negative ecological consequences of space pollution.
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2.1  Outer Space Pollution Under International 
Responsibility Regime for Wrongful Acts
In order to achieve a more effective protection of the outer space environment both 
for the present and the future generations, in future the importance of the width of 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty,1 specifically suggesting the applicability of the 
international responsibility regime for wrongful acts towards space exploration and 
use, should be stressed. The reason behind the use of this legal framework is that its 
provisions could potentially play an invaluable role both in the prevention of the 
illegal activity of contamination, in space and on celestial bodies and in the removal 
of the negative ecological consequences of space refuse.
In this regard, when secondary norms have to be searched for, the norms on State 
responsibility for wrongful acts become the only ones applicable to the protection 
of the outer space environment per se.2 That being said, this regime would also be 
suggested by the last sentence of Principle XIV of the 1986 Declaration of Principles 
Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space, stating that the application of 
strict liability to remote sensing is « […] without prejudice to the applicability of the 
norms of international law […]»3 and is clearly consistent with Article III of the 
Outer Space Treaty provisions.
As a general rule, international responsibility arises when a wrongful act occurs.4
In this view, the notion of responsibility refers to the new secondary relationship 
arising between the injured State and the responsible one, as a consequence of the 
breach of the international obligation. This relationship has a complex content, 
since it does not refer exclusively to the reparation of such a breach, but also includes 
1 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967, namely the Outer Space Treaty.
2 As a matter of fact, as authoritative doctrine underlined, referring to Chap. 4 of the 1998 Report 
of the International Law Commission: «The ambit of the Draft Articles (on the International 
Liability Arising from Acts Not Prohibited by International Law) […] although centring on ques-
tions of prevention, has been restricted to the “Prevention of Transboundary Damage from 
Hazardous Activities” and clearly refer to harm done to another State, not to damage or harm 
caused outwith all territorial jurisdictions to the environment qua environment».
And in more recent times, Marchisio echoed: «[…] If we look at the current situation of general 
international law, we can see that absolute/strict liability for harmful consequences of internation-
ally lawful activities is not reflected yet by specific customary norms. It is well known that the Draft 
Articles on prevention of the transboundary harm from hazardous activities adopted by the ILC in 
2001 confirms such a conclusion». See: f. lyall, Protection of the Space Environment and Law, 
in 39th Colloquium L. Outer Space, 1996, 476. s. marchisio, Protecting the Space Environment, 
in 46th Colloquium L. Outer Space, 2003, 14. See also: Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), Report of 
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 2001.
3 UNGA Res. 41/65 of 3 December 1986, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from 
Space.
4 According to Article 1 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: “Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibil-
ity of that State”.
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the right to obtain the compliance of the primary obligation violated, as well as to 
punish the illegal behaviour.
If compared with the liability regime, the two notions have to be completely 
distinguished, the former having an ex post approach (except for the guarantee of 
non-repetition) and referring to the national activities of the State, while the latter 
showing both an ex ante and an ex post approach, as well as referring to the damages 
caused by a national space object.
Nevertheless, distinction does not imply that the two regimes cannot intersect. 
Specifically, if the State acted diligently, taking all the appropriate measures to 
avoid harm or to mitigate its consequences when the risk materialised, but the dam-
age occurred nonetheless, only liability will be applied. However, if these due dili-
gence obligations are breached, the regime of international responsibility for 
wrongful acts will be activated, in connection with the liability one, as referred in 
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and specified in the 1972 Convention on 
International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects framework.
As a matter of fact, particularly from the environmental perspective, the breach 
by a State of its due diligence obligations, resulting in a significant damage caused 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond national jurisdiction, deter-
mines State legal responsibility.5
Finally, also their consequences are different, the former expecting restitution, or 
compensation including both the actual damages and lost profits, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition, the latter leading only to a compensation for the dam-
age suffered, once the harm has occurred, which is lower than the compensation 
provided under the responsibility regime.6
2.1.1  Constitutive Requirements of Internationally Wrongful 
Act: Subjective Element
Concerning, the sources of the international responsibility regulation, this is gov-
erned by international customary law. However, in order to have more order in the 
exposition, the present work will rely on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Draft Articles), adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 2001.7 As a matter of fact, these 59 articles are the 
result of both international customary rules and international law development, 
embracing both the constituent elements and the consequences of any wrongful act.
5 I.C.J. Reports 2010, Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay).
6 In this view, the liability system is instrumental to ensure an adequate allocation of loss in case of 
damages caused by ultra-hazardous activities.
7 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001. See also: 
Report of the International Law Commission at its 53rd Session. In the present work, it will be 
referred as the ILC Draft Articles.
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In this view, they provide a model applicable, in principle, for the breach of any 
international rule of law.
First of all, in order to ascertain the existence of an international responsibility, 
two conditions should be satisfied: the act should be ascribable to a State, according 
to international law, and there should be a breach of an international obligation rest-
ing on the State at the time of the act commission. As a matter of fact, according to 
Article 2 of the ILC Draft Articles: “There is an internationally wrongful act of a 
State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the 
State under International Law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obli-
gation of the State”.8 In this view, it might be referred to these two requirements as 
a subjective element and an objective one.
Concerning the subjective element, as a general rule, a “human action” can be 
considered a “State action” only when it is accomplished by an agent of the State 
which has acted in such a role.9 However, in the international space law regime, this 
complex mechanism of attribution is circumvented through Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty.
Even if at a first glance it might be argued that the term “responsibility” simply 
recalls the notion of international responsibility for wrongful acts, this interpreta-
tion is not correct. Rather, this expression produces the attribution of private space 
activities on the national State.10 In this view, the Outer Space Treaty guarantees that 
States cannot escape their legal obligations under international law claiming that an 
activity is carried out through the medium of international organisations or non- 
governmental bodies. For this reason, some authors referred to the responsibility in 
the space law field as objective responsibility, since the “objective” responsible sub-
ject is not necessarily the direct author of the wrongful act, but rather it is “under the 
obligation to assume the consequences of it by virtue of its determinant position in 
relation to the activity at the origin of the harm. (Therefore) it [the responsible sub-
ject] is responsible, automatically and independently of any wrongful act”.11
8 Ibidem.
9 This legal operation, through which the conduct of a physical person, whether it be an action or 
omission, is qualified as a “State action” is called “attribution”.
10 In order to have a full explanation of the principle recalled here, the author refers back to the 
original version of Condorelli: “[…] On a voulu, d’une part, soumettre les États à des obligations 
spécialement lourdes de surveillance et de contrôle, d’autre part, leur faire supporter la respon-
sabilité internationale pour tout fait illicite spatial susceptible d’être perpétré au cours des activités 
en question. Dans ce but, non seulement on a renforcé, ici, de façon éclatante, l’obligation de type 
classique de “diligence due”, mais on a assorti celle-ci d’une règle spéciale (dérogeant aux princi-
pes communs sur l’imputation des faits illicites […]) d’après laquelle les comportements spatiaux 
des particuliers sont intégralement assimilés à ceux des organes et des entités de l’État, donc impu-
tés à celui-ci”. See: Luigi Condorelli, ʽLa Réparation des Dommages Catastrophiques Causés par 
les Activités Spatialesʼ, in La Réparation des Dommages Catastrophiques. Les Risques 
Technologiques Majeurs en Droit International et en Droit Communautaire (Travaux des XIIIes 
Journées d’Études Juridiques Jean Dabin Organisées par le Département de Droit International 
Charles De Visscher, Université Catholique de Louvain 1990) 270.
11 This is also the reason why such kinds of responsibility are usually connected to a compulsory 
insurance system. See: Céline Négre, ʽResponsibility and International Environmental Lawʼ, in 
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Nevertheless, a large debate has surrounded the meaning of “national activities” 
and the “appropriate State”, since according to the textual interpretation the 
“national State” seems to bear international responsibility for its national activities, 
while the “appropriate State” should authorise and supervise such activities. 
Specifically, the problem has been to establish if these two States were different 
States.
If the responsibility for activities carried on by governmental agencies does not 
raise significant issues, in the case of activities carried on by non-governmental enti-
ties, the answer is not that univocal. In this view, the most appropriate approach is 
to determine State responsibility by general aspects of public international law, i.e. 
“a State has jurisdiction over any activity that is carried on from its territory as well 
as over any activity that is carried on by its nationals (natural or juridical persons). 
[…] Responsibility is to be understood in terms of Article VI i.e. the State whose 
nationals undertake the activity (i.e. the launching or the operation of the object that 
is going to be launched) or from whose territory such activity is undertaken”.12
In light of this interpretation, the State which will register the object in its national 
register will become the State of registry, retaining then jurisdiction and control 
over the space object, and the State which retains jurisdiction and control over the 
space object will also be the one able to claim requirements and conditions in the 
operation of that object, authorising the activity.13
Accordingly, it might be presumed that the appropriate State, usually, will also 
correspond to a national one,14 so that the national State will have three main obliga-
tions: to authorise private activities, to supervise such activities and to guarantee 
that these activities will be consistent with the Outer Space Treaty provisions.15
This is the interpretation which seems to be supported also by the travaux 
préparatoires of the Outer Space Treaty which do not show any deviation from the 
general concepts of public international law and by State practice.16
James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility 
(OUP 2010) 807.
See also: Benedetto Conforti, Diritto Internazionale (10th edn., Editoriale scientifica 2010) 
405.
12 Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd, Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Cologne Commentary on Space Law: 
Outer Space Treaty, vol. 1 (1st edn., Carl Heymanns 2009) 112.
13 idem.
14 Marco Pedrazzi, ʽOuter Space, Liability for Damageʼ, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2008) 2.
15 Marco Pedrazzi, Danni Causati da Attività Spaziali e Responsabilità Internazionale (1st edn., 
Giuffré 1996) 36.
16 For more information, visit the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs website: http://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/travaux-preparatoires/outerspacetreaty.html
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2.1.2  Objective Element
The second fundamental requirement of the international wrongful act is the breach 
of an international obligation, i.e. the contrast between the behaviour kept in prac-
tice by the responsible State and that which was required according to the interna-
tional rule of law violated.
As a matter of fact, as stated by Article 12 of the ILC Draft Articles: “There is a 
breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of the State is not in 
conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or 
character”.17
In this view, from this provision, two elements emerge: first of all, the irrelevance 
of the origin of the international obligation breached, secondly, that it is the content 
of the primary norm violated to determine whether an act is wrongful or not.
According to the ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles, obligations may arise 
for a State by a treaty and by a rule of customary international law or by a treaty and 
a unilateral act.18
As the ILC Draft Articles underline, international responsibility is not divided 
between contractual (ex contractu) and delictual (ex delicto) responsibility.19 As a 
matter of fact, as stated by the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the 1997 case 
concerning the Gabčíkovo – Nagymaros Project: “It is […] well established that, 
when a State has committed an internationally wrongful act, its international respon-
sibility is likely to be involved whatever the nature of the obligation it has failed to 
respect”.20 In this view, from the choice of words both in the ILC Draft Articles and 
in the I.C.J. statement, the expression “breach of an obligation” rather than “breach 
of a rule” or of a “norm” underlines that what matters in the context of responsibility 
is not the existence of a norm in an abstract form. Rather what counts is the exis-
tence of an obligation in concrete circumstances. In other words, this means that 
where an internationally wrongful act took place, the origin of such an obligation 
does not change the fact.21 The question does not seem to be merely dialectical, 
since it is instrumental to understand that the regime of responsibility is unique for 
all breaches of obligation, without the rise of different regimes of responsibility in 
the view of the different sources which generated the obligations violated.22
17 See footnote n. 7.
18 ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful 
Acts, 2001, para. 4, 126.
19 As a matter of fact, also the International Law Commission in the 2001 Draft Articles avoided to 
recall the distinction, proposed in the 1996 Project of Articles, between international crimes and 
international delicts.
20 I.C.J.  Reports 1997, Case Concerning the the Gabčíkovo  – Nagymaros Project (Hungary  – 
Slovakia), 25 September 1997, para. 47, 38.
21 Yumi Nishimura, ʽSource of the Obligationʼ, in James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson 
(eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 368.
22 However, it should be noted that “no specific regime” does not mean that the regime of State 
responsibility would not differ according to the substantive content of the obligation violated or the 
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2.1.2.1  Primary Norm Violated: The Obligation of Means
At this point, therefore, it is essential to identify the primary norm violated, from 
which it would have derived an obligation of the State to act or to refrain from 
engaging in a particular conduct.
In international law, different types of obligations might be distinguished: con-
ventional or customary obligations, according to their sources; positive or negative 
obligations, according to their content; and preventive or repressive obligations, 
according to the specific goal of each obligation.
However, these obligations are not relegated in autonomous compartments, since 
an international obligation usually presents different features simultaneously.
For this reason, when a breach of international obligations should be verified: 
“The principal focus will be on the primary obligation concerned. It is this which 
has to be interpreted and applied to the situation, determining thereby the substance 
of the conduct required, the standard to be observed, the result to be achieved 
[…]”.23
Starting from this setting, it should be understood from which primary norm 
these obligations arise and what types of obligations are violated when space pollu-
tion occurs.
In order to do so, it might be helpful to consider space pollution, regarded as a 
threat for the outer space environment per se, as an environmental concern. In this 
view, it should be argued that environmental responsibility within the framework of 
environmental law usually results in a violation of customary obligations. In this 
regard, it might be the Outer Space Treaty to crystallise already existing customary 
rules of law, in this specific case the principle of due diligence in space activities, 
with Article IX, and the principle of equitable access to outer space, ex Article I, 
both intended as a specification of the general principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas, i.e. the obligation to exercise each own right without prejudice for other 
subjects’ interests.24 Moreover, the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines adopted 
by the United Nations Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN 
particular relationship created by international obligation (i.e. if the obligation is only between the 
Parties or it is an erga omnes duty). As a matter of fact, these features of the obligation breached 
will be reflected by the content of the responsibility and the legitimacy to invoke it.
23 ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful 
Acts, 2001, para. 2, 123.
24 In order to have a full explanation of the principle recalled here, the author refers back to the 
original version of Carbone, Luzzatto and Santa Maria: “(I principi generali) esprimono immedi-
atamente certe specifiche caratteristiche della struttura del sistema giuridico nel quale la società 
internazionale è organizzata. […] Possono essere considerati […] come ricavati in via induttiva da 
regole consuetudinarie, e partecipano dei caratteri propri di queste quanto ai loro elementi costitu-
tivi ed al loro valore formale: non esiste, dunque, alcuna differenza di posizione gerarchica delle 
due categorie di regole. […] Si tratta altro che di una particolare categoria di norme consuetudina-
rie”. See: Riccardo Luzzatto, ʽIl Diritto Internazionale Generale e le Sue Fontiʼ, in Sergio 
M. Carbone, Riccardo Luzzatto, Alberto Santa Maria (eds), Istituzioni di Diritto Internazionale 
(5th edn., Giappichelli Editore 2016) 52.
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COPUOS)25 would serve to establish a standard of care in the exercise of the due 
diligence required for the conduct of outer space activities.
In International Environmental Law, the first step in the examination of the 
breach of the international primary norm, is to ascertain whether the State acted 
according to the due diligence principle. In this view, the content of the obligation 
of prevention is not limited to the duty to supervise its nationals’ activities, which is 
an obligation of means, but also every State is barred from voluntarily causing a 
significant ecological harm, not only to the territory of another State but also to 
areas beyond national control.26 In this regard, the duty to prevent is also an obliga-
tion of result.27
Therefore, from the “means” perspective, the State has the obligation to control. 
In this view, the authorising and supervising State will have to guarantee that all the 
measures expected from a “good government” not to cause damage have been 
taken.28
In the space law field, such measures might be a set of compulsory systems and 
procedures to avoid space debris, as well as mitigation measures when the debris 
generation cannot be avoided at all.29 As a matter of fact, according to the working 
group of the International Law Commission in its 1978 report: “The essential obli-
gation owed by a State in such a context has tended to be conceived as one of mod-
eration, or of care or due diligence, in relation to its own activities or of private 
activities within its jurisdiction or control”.30 In this view, States have the duty to 
ensure that the harmful activities of their nationals are conducted with due regard 
for other States interests, as well as for their duties under International Law. National 
laws licensing are the means by which States fulfil their obligation to control their 
nationals’ activities. However, these national laws should meet certain require-
ments, specifically the limits of the Outer Space Treaty provisions and those of 
international law.31
25 UN doc. A/62/20, Annex to the Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, i. 
e. UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 2007.
26 See: I.C.J. Reports 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
para. 29, p. 242.
27 In this view, it should be noted that in the field on environmental law, generally obligations are 
conceived as obligations of conduct. See: Gerhard Hafner, Isabelle Buffard, ʽObligations of 
Prevention and the Precautionary Principleʼ, in in James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson 
(eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 530.
28 As a matter of fact, although in international law there is not an explicit obligation to avoid causal 
damage to other States space assets, however there should be the duty to observe a standard of care 
or due diligence in performing space activities. See: Joyeeta Chatterjee, ʽLegal Issues Relating to 
Unauthorised Space Debris Remediationʼ, paper presented at the 65th International Astronautical 
Congress held in Toronto, 2014.
29 In this view, spacecrafts disposal and active debris removal techniques are efficient means of 
mitigation.
30 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1978, vol. 2, para. 19, 151.
31 This means that: “(Advertising, but it might be replaced by) Activities that would so substantially 
clutter the orbit that it would become impossible for other States to explore outer space would 
likely violate International law” and that where authorisation was issued despite such a risk, the 
G. Pavesi
annette.froehlich@espi.or.at
23
At this point, two might be the options: if the State implemented all the precau-
tions necessary to avoid harmful contamination, the international subject might be 
considered discharged by its due diligence obligation. In this case, if harm occurs 
nonetheless, the State will be considered only liable under international law. On the 
other side, if the State did not comply with its due diligence obligation, i.e. in case 
of a totally absence of such measures, the obligation of means grounded by the 
primary norm would be breached.
As a matter of fact, the purpose of the due diligence principle is to oblige the 
space-faring nation to have “a much higher standard of care in designing policies 
and a much higher degree of vigour […] to enforce them”.32 In this view, the respon-
sible State will be liable, if harm occurs, and responsible for the breach of an inter-
national obligation, at this time regardless of whether the damage occurred or not.33
As a consequence, the defaulting State will be subject to objective responsibili-
ty.34 In this regard, such a qualification has three main consequences: responsibility 
is engaged directly by the occurrence of the harm, the victim will not have to dem-
onstrate the breach of the law and the responsible subject will not be necessarily the 
direct author of the damage, although it will be “under an obligation to assume the 
consequences of it by virtue of its determinant position in relation to the relevant 
activity at the origin of the harm. It is responsible automatically […]”.35
2.1.2.2  Obligation of Result
Moreover, there may be another case of internationally wrongful act, always 
grounded on these primary norms of international law, which relies on the interna-
tional obligation of result. Indeed, the obligation to supervise corresponds with the 
obligation of every State to refrain from voluntarily causing a significant ecological 
harm to the environment also in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
The problem is that usually pollution is inherent to space activities, which may 
imply that a State took all the appropriate measures to avoid space debris  generation, 
authorising State would be in breach of its international obligations and arguably have committed 
an internationally wrongful act”. See: Jai Galliott, Commercial Space Exploration: Ethics, Policy 
and Governance (1st edn., Routledge 2015) 102.
See also: Frank J. Balsamello, ʽWhen You Wish Upon a Falling Billboardʼ (2010) 28 Geo. L. J. 
1785.
32 United Nations, International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1996, vol. 2, part. 2, 111.
33 “If international responsibility is ruled out (in case of conventional mechanisms), it nevertheless 
reappears in cases of persistent failure, although […] adapted to damage to the global environment 
in the framework of “non-compliance” procedures”. See: Nègre (n.11) 809.
34 This way, all the difficulties linked to the proof of the internationally wrongful act, i.e. the breach 
of the obligation of prevention and the casual link between the negligence and the harmful conse-
quences suffered, will be avoided.
35 Nègre (n.11) 807.
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but space pollution occurred nonetheless. In this view, as demonstrated before, the 
State will be only liable.
However, as it might be easily observed, in every civil system beside the notion 
of pollution, there is usually the concept of tolerance threshold.
This last element is particularly important, since it might be a contradiction to act 
like a “good government”, nationally adopting all the appropriate due diligence 
standards for space activities, but then to carry out an anti-satellite test (ASAT) 
which alone produces an amount of debris which might be, for instance, ten times 
higher than the one avoided by the State through the national implementation of 
mitigation measures. As a matter of fact, a serious danger to the outer space environ-
ment arises from the development of space weapons, the worst source of intentional 
space debris production.
In this view, the level of tolerance comes from Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, 
according to which the breach of the obligation of conduct is fulfilled when the 
environmental degradation of outer space results in a significant amount of new 
pieces of space debris, which in practice prevents the equitable access and utilisa-
tion of outer space.
From this perspective, the result perspective more precisely, it is mainly a par-
ticular conduct to be qualified as a wrongful act according to the 2001 ILC Draft 
Articles: the intentional destruction of space systems, i.e. the deliberate production 
of space debris from a space-faring nation, which may cause serious contamination 
for the outer space environment per se, which could be potentially irreversible.
Anti-satellite tests, being hazardous activities, may pollute the outer space envi-
ronment with long-lasting and hazardous debris, specifically high-altitude debris, 
causing the unavailability of vast orbital regions, both for use or transit, in this view 
violating the international customary rule to leave free access to space as well as the 
equitable utilisation of a common resource.
Moreover, the ASAT tests, more than any other threat to the outer space environ-
ment, do not imply a mere de minimis harm. Rather, a significant injury to the outer 
space environment is inherent to such activities, going to affect all the States 
involved in outer space activities. As a matter of fact, their consequences would fall 
not only on the directly damaged ones but, having very long-term effects, they 
would weigh also on the future generations of space actors, whose legitimate inter-
est in the preservation of the outer space environment should be safeguarded.36
However, it should be underlined that even though these activities are hazardous 
activities which inevitably bring with them some risks, they are per se perfectly 
legal. As a matter of fact, these tests represent the legitimate implementation of 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which: “Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defence”37 and of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, which enshrines the right 
36 David A.  Koplow, ʽAsat-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-
Satellite Weaponsʼ (2008) 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1187–1272.
37 Charter of the United Nations (1945).
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of States Parties to dispose of their own satellites, including the right to destroy their 
space objects.38
For this reason, the legality or illegality of these activities should not be grounded 
on the risk they may involve, but rather on the concrete violation of the primary 
international obligation.39
An example may help to clarify this reasoning. In 2007 the People’s Republic of 
China led an anti-satellite test, destroying its nonoperational weather satellite, 
Fengyun-1C (FY-C1). One year later, the United States announced that they were 
planning an anti-satellite test, and after a few days they repeated the same test, 
destroying a derelict satellite which was decaying out of orbit and coming back to 
Earth.
At first glance, it may seem that the conducts of the two States were identical, but 
it is not so. As a matter of fact, China destroyed its satellite at an altitude of 863 km 
in a direct ascent attack, while the United States destroyed their spacecraft at an 
altitude of 214 km.
More specifically, the United States openly recognised that their experiment 
would have created harmful contamination, in the meaning of Article IX of the 
Outer Space Treaty, and took measures to avoid it by intercepting the satellite in a 
decaying orbit placed at a low altitude and, thus, minimising the uprising of space 
debris.
On the opposite, China did not conduct its test trying to mitigate the production 
of space pollution, using low decaying orbits or inclinations able to minimise the 
harmful contamination.
As a result, the experiment introduced thousands of new debris both in the polar 
and in the Low Earth orbits, deeply modifying their environment and making their 
use more dangerous for future operations.40
In this view, it might be maintained that if, on the one side, the United States 
discharged themselves from their due diligence obligation, China did not. As a mat-
ter of fact, if, on the one side, China breached its international obligation of means, 
without providing appropriate preventive measures, shaped on the due diligence 
principle, on the other side, it violated its connected obligation of result, causing 
harmful contamination and prejudicing the principle of equitable access to outer 
space.
38 Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty states: “A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an 
object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object […] 
while in outer space […]. Ownership of objects launched into outer space […], and of their com-
ponent parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space […]”.
39 In legal theory there is a distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda, the former referring to law 
“as it is”, the latter representing the law as “it ought to be”. In this view, only from lex lata descends 
the legality or illegality of an action.
40 T. S. Kelso, ‘Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT Test and the Impact of its Debris on the Space 
Environmentʼ, paper presented during the 2007 Amos Conference held in Maui, Hawaii.
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2.2  Legitimacy to Invoke State Responsibility
Having now defined the rules establishing the conditions under which international 
responsibility arises and the content of the State’s reparative conduct, the States 
against which such obligations are due, i.e. thus those entitled to invoke State 
responsibility, should be identified.
The general principle formalised by Article 42 of the ILC Draft Articles states 
that: “A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another 
State if the obligation breached is owed to: (a) that State individually; or (b) a group 
of States including that State, or the international community as a whole, and the 
breach of the obligation: (i) specifically affects that State; or (ii) is of such a charac-
ter as radically to change the position of all other States to which the obligation is 
owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation”.
However, in case of breach of a duty to prevent the outer space environment per 
se from pollution, it might be difficult to identify who should be considered the 
“injured State”, under Article 42 of the ILC Draft Articles, specifically because the 
ILC provision seems to refer only to those States whose interests and rights have 
been directly affected by the internationally wrongful act.41
In this view, it might be Article 48 of the ILC Draft Articles to offer a solution, 
establishing that: “Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of another State […] if: (a) the obligation breached is owed to a group 
of States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective 
interest of the group; (b) the obligation breached is owed to the international com-
munity as a whole”.
However, first of all, it should be clarified the meaning of “States other than the 
injured one”. As a matter of fact, two may be the options: this expression refers to 
third parties absolutely not affected by the illegal conduct, or this terminology indi-
cates a State which has been affected by the wrongful act outside the Article 42 
conditions, i.e. it has suffered only an indirect prejudice.
In this view, only the second solution should be the correct one.
Once understood the beneficiaries of this provision, this should be applied to 
outer space actors. In this view, if the States Parties to the 1967 OST may be included 
in the category provided by subparagraph 1(a), whose main purpose is to foster a 
common interest, over and above any interests of the States concerned individually, 
the question may be whether States non-parties fall under paragraph 1(b) of the ILC 
Draft Articles.42
41 Marchisio (n.2) 15.
42 However, it should be noted that actually, in practice, the distinction between the two categories 
may be blurred. As a matter of fact, if it is true that generally speaking environment protection 
obligations fall under the former category, being regulated through regional conventional instru-
ments, thus operating on the basis of reciprocity, they may overlap with the latter classification, as 
far as the regional mechanism incorporates the erga omnes obligations. See: Antonio Cassese, 
ʽGrave Breaches of Obligations Owed to the International Community as a Whole: the Character 
of the Violationʼ, in James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson (eds.), The Law of International 
Responsibility (OUP 2010) 415–421.
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The question is to verify whether the obligation breached, through the generation 
of space pollution, is owed to the internationally community as a whole, in the view 
of the importance of the rights involved, or not.
As a matter of fact, the so-called obligations erga omnes are inherent to the inter-
national community itself and are by definition collective obligations protecting the 
interests of the international community per se.
In this view, Article 48 of the ILC Draft Articles provides a specific rule for the 
breach of obligations serving the community interest. Indeed, this aspect of the men-
tioned involves a measure of progressive development, justified by the fact that it 
provides a means of protection for the community (or collective) interest at stake.43
From the international space law perspective, the answer may come from an 
example of community interest, i.e. the interest in the protection of common spaces. 
As a matter of fact, the protection of these sources is usually achieved through the 
internationalisation of these spaces, thus excluding them from national jurisdic-
tion.44 In this view, internationalisation aims at leaving these spaces free for explora-
tion and use, as well as protecting the interests of the future generations.45
In this sense, remembering that outer space is a res communis omnium, and 
enhancing the role of Article I and IX of the Outer Space Treaty46 in preserving 
not only the free access to such an environment but also its preservation for the 
future generations of space actors, it may be maintained that the protection of 
outer space could fall under the scope of subparagraph 1(b) of Article 48 of the 
ILC Draft Articles, its protection representing a common interest of the whole 
community.47
Moreover, even narrowing the protection offered by the aforementioned Article 
48 only to those breaches concerning the involvement of human rights, as reminded 
by the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, namely, the 
43 ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful 
Acts, 2001, para. 12, 323.
44 Isabel Feichtner, ʽCommunity Interestʼ, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(2007) 6.
45 For the intersection between environment protection and sustainable development, see: Edith 
Brown Weiss, ʽOur Rights and Obligations to Future Generationsʼ (1990) 84 Am. J.  Int’l L. 
198–207.
46 Annex to the UNGA Res. 2222 (XXI) of 19 December 1966, Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies.
In the present work, it will be referred as the Outer Space Treaty.
47 This theory, according to which international obligations for the environmental protection may 
have an erga omnes effect, seems to be shared also by Lotta Viikari which adds: “This (assump-
tion) holds true in particular if the erga omnes character of obligations is not determined narrowly 
by whether all States have standing to bring proceedings before an international tribunal in the 
event of a breach, but on the basis of a right or ability of the international community to hold an 
individual State accountable for compliance with the obligations through other institutions, such as 
the Conference of the Parties […] in case of climate changes”. Lotta Viikari, The Environmental 
Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future (Brill/Nijhoff 2008) 
140–141.
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Stockholm Conference, also environmental protection is a necessary condition for 
the promotion of peace, human rights and development, so that since outer space 
may be totally included under the notion of environment,48 also its protection should 
be a necessary condition for humankind development.
Finally, concerning the type of conduct that these States may invoke, States’ 
entitlement is limited to the claim of the unlawful conduct cessation, guarantees of 
non-repetition and compliance with the breached obligation.49
2.3  Conclusions: Consequences of State Responsibility
According to Article 30 of the ILC Draft Articles: “The State responsible for the 
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act, if it is con-
tinuing […]”.
In this view, the first consequence of the international responsibility is the obliga-
tion of cessation of the wrongful act.50 However, cessation may also be seen as a late 
compliance of the international obligation originally breached.51 In this perspective, 
as noticed by the International Law Commission “cessation is situated […] in 
between the two categories of rules”,52 primary and secondary ones.
Therefore, the consequences of this violation have to be determined by reference 
to the obligation violated, so that the cessation must take the form of an action or an 
omission.
Concerning space debris, the obligation of cessation should refer more generally 
to the duty to avoid space pollution, and more specifically to the arrangement of 
national regulations concerning space debris mitigation as well as spacecraft dis-
posal systems, when the breach of the international obligation involves the State 
duty to supervise its nationals’ activities (obligation of means).
On the other hand, when the State has complied with its obligation of means but 
intentionally produced a serious hazard for the space environment engaging in mis-
sile tests without complying with its due diligence duty (conducting them, for 
48 Laura Pineschi, La Protezione dell’Ambiente in Antartide (1st edn., Cedam 1993) 30.
49 Luigi Fumagalli, ʽIllecito e Responsabilitàʼ, in Sergio M. Carbone, Riccardo Luzzatto, Alberto 
Santa Maria (eds), Istituzioni di Diritto Internazionale (5th edn., Giappichelli Editore 2016) 52.
50 For the theory maintaining that the obligation of cessation should be considered as a secondary 
rule, see: Karl Zemanek, ʽLa Responsabilité des États pour Faits Internationalement Illicites ainsi 
que pour Faits Internationalement Licitesʼ, in Prosper Weil, Responsabilité Internationale (1st 
edn., Éditions A. Pedone 1987) 65.
51 In this view, the obligation of cessation is a form of implementation of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda, because the State is owed to respect its international obligations. For the theory that the 
obligation of cessation should be considered a primary obligation, see: Christian Dominicé, 
ʽObservations sur les Droits de l’État Victime d’un Fait Internationalement Illiciteʼ, in Weil (n.50) 
27.
52 ILC Yearbook 1993, Commentary to Draft Articles, para. 4, 55.
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instance, on high or deeply crowded orbits), the obligation of cessation might not be 
easily distinguished by the obligation to make reparation.
The second consequence of international responsibility is the obligation to 
entirely make reparation. Indeed, in all legal systems, the notion of responsibility 
implies the substitution of a primary obligation by a secondary or subsidiary obliga-
tion, i.e. to make reparation for the consequences of the breach. As underlined by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory at Chorzów case: “It is a 
principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obliga-
tion to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispens-
able complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this 
to be stated in the convention itself. Differences relating to reparations, which may 
be due by reason of failure to apply a convention, are consequently differences relat-
ing to its application”.53 Moreover, the Permanent Court added: “The essential prin-
ciple contained in the actual notion of an illegal act, a principle which seems to be 
established by international practice […], is that reparation must, so far as possible, 
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”.54
In this view, the form of reparation which is most suitable for space debris reme-
diation is restitution in kind (restitutio in integrum), i.e. the re-establishment of the 
situation existing before the wrongful act was committed (status quo ante).55
However, it might be contested that it is difficult to establish in what way a resti-
tution in kind will be feasible in outer space, once a State has harmfully contami-
nated some orbital regions.
It is not so. Rather it might be argued that this mechanism actually finds its great-
est potential in international space law.
As a matter of fact, if a new duty to restore the previous situation rested on the 
responsible State, this will entail that the State might be obliged to put in place 
active debris removal mechanisms.56 In this view, the responsible States might be 
obliged to remove the debris they produced in breach of their due diligence 
obligations.
Moreover, also the temporal element plays a relevant role in this phase. 
Specifically, the distinction between an “instant” and a “continuous” breach is not 
merely theoretical. As stated by the arbitral tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior case: 
“(On the contrary) it has practical consequences, since the seriousness of the breach 
and its prolongation in time cannot fail to have considerable bearing on the 
53 PCIJ Reports, Series A, Factory at Chorzów (Jurisdiction), 26 July 1927, No. 9, 21.
54 PCIJ Reports, Series A, Factory at Chorzów (Merits), 13 September 1928, No. 17, 27.
55 In this view, Article 35 of the ILC Draft Articles establishes: “A State responsible for an interna-
tionally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation 
which existed before the wrongful act was committed […]”.
56 Peter Malanczuk, ʽReview of the Regulatory Regime Governing the Space Environment. The 
Problem of Space Debrisʼ, in (1995) 38 Colloquium L. Outer Space, 355–382.
See also: Stephan Hobe, ʽEnvironmental Protection in Outer Space: Where we Stand and What 
is Needed to Make Progress with Regard to the Problem of Space Debrisʼ (2012) 8 The Indian J. L. 
& Tech. 1–10.
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 establishment of the reparation which is adequate for a violation presenting these 
two features”.57
Specifically, when the violated obligation requires the State to prevent the occur-
rence of a given event, the violation takes place at the moment when such an event 
occurs and extends for the whole period in which the event produces its effects, 
contrasting with the content of the violated obligation.58
Moreover, as reminded by the arbitral tribunal, it is indisputable that the features 
of the wrongful act, i.e. the seriousness and the prolongation, will affect the deter-
mination of the obligation of reparation. Specifically, the seriousness of space pol-
lution, as well as its consequences in the long term, will be balanced when the 
obligation of restitution will be regarded in light of the limits settled by Article 35 
of the ILC Draft Articles, according to which restitution should not be materially 
impossible and it should not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit 
deriving from restitution instead of compensation.59
Finally, as a closing provision, Article 32 of the just mentioned Articles under-
lines that the obligation to make reparation should never be subject to restrictions 
arising from national law, stating that: “The responsible State may not rely on the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its obliga-
tions under this Part”.60
Through a stronger enhancement of the importance of Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty and a more defined delineation of the perimeter of its applicability, the 
1967 Convention might become a truly enforceable framework, going to remediate 
its inherent vagueness which in the long term may risk to compromise the future 
exploration and use of the outer space environment.
The solution offered in this analysis might go to strengthen the States’ obligation 
to prevent contaminating outer space, a duty which might be inferred from a joint 
reading of Articles I and IX of the Outer Space Treaty, creating an effective mecha-
nism to ensure a long-lasting sustainability of outer space activities also for future 
generations and new developing actors.
This assumption may be particularly helpful not only in order to mitigate the 
production of space debris but also in the perspective of their remediation.
At the end of the day, if States have the international obligation to remove the 
debris they produced, perhaps a tragedy of commons will still be avoided.
57 Arbitral Tribunal, Rainbow Warrior (New Zeland vs. France), 30 April 1990, para. 101, 264.
58 See footnote 42.
59 In this view, probably, the costs of Active Debris Removal will be a criterion to evaluate the 
impossibility of States compliance.
60 See footnote n. 7.
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Chapter 3
Intentional Destruction of Satellites 
in Relation to International Peace and Security
Alexander Gairiseb
Abstract Some countries have developed antisatellite technology and deliberately 
destroy satellites. However, intentional destruction of satellites contributes to space 
debris, which is hazardous or deleterious, and disturbs the international community 
in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Therefore, the Security Council 
should exercise its discretionary powers conferred to it by the UN Charter to deter-
mine that intentional destruction of satellites is a threat to peace or breach of peace.
3.1  International Peace and Security Under UN Charter
The United Nations was established with the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security, and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace.1
The UN maintains international peace and security through the Security Council, 
which is the organ established within its setup.2 In particular, in order to ensure 
prompt and effective action by the United Nations, the Security Council (herein 
referred to as the ‘SC’) is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security,3 provided the Security Council acts in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations.4 Consequently, as part of its responsibil-
ity to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council can determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.5 In 
addition, the Security Council can decide what measures should be taken in order to 
1 UN Charter, art.1, para.1.
2 ibid. art.7, para 1.
3 Ibid. art.24, para.1.
4 Ibid. art.24, para.2.
5 Ibid. art.39.
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maintain or restore international peace and security.6 On the one hand, the Security 
Council may decide to take measures that do not involve the use of armed forces; 
this may include complete or partial interruptions of economic relations and of rail, 
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the sever-
ance of diplomatic relations.7
3.2  Concepts of Threat to Peace or Breach of Peace
The UN Charter as it stands does not contain the definition of the concept of threat 
to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression. However, the concept of aggression 
was defined in the General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 
1974 as ‘the use of armed forces by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations’.8 For the purpose of this analysis, the author 
will focus on the first two concepts.
As alluded to earlier, the concepts of threat to peace or breach of the peace are 
not defined within the UN Charter. However, even if the Charter does not define 
these concepts, the ordinary meaning should be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.9 But when we 
consider the fact that the UN Charter was concluded before the entry into force of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, we could deduce that the provisions 
of the Convention, namely, the rules of interpretation in Article 31 and 32, will not 
apply to the UN Charter.10 On the contrary, the UN Charter is a constituent instru-
ment of an international organization; thus the Vienna Convention applies to it even 
if the UN Charter was concluded before the entry into force of the Vienna 
Convention,11 not to mention that the rules of interpretation of treaties acquired the 
status of customary international law which applies to all States generally. 
Consequently, the provisions of Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention will be 
utilized in the interpretation of the concepts of threat to peace or breach of peace in 
this article.
However, I should stressed that it is not the purpose of this analysis to provide a 
detailed interpretation of the UN Charter but just to provide or substantiate the link 
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. art 0.41.
8 G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties U.N.T.S. (1969), entered into force 27 Jan. 1980, Art. 
31, para.1.
10 Ibid. art.4.
The Vienna Convention entered into force in 1980, whereas the UN Charter was concluded in 
1945.
11 Ibid.art.5.
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between intentional destruction of satellites and the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
The ordinary meaning of the term threat according to the Oxford Dictionary 
denotes: ‘2. a person or thing likely to cause damage or danger’.12 Meanwhile peace 
was defined as ‘freedom from disturbance; tranquillity’.13 In addition, the Oxford 
Dictionary defines the term breach as ‘an act of breaking or failing to observe a law, 
agreement or code of conduct’.14 On the other hand, Collins Dictionary defines the 
term breach of the peace as ‘conduct creating or tending to create a disturbance of 
the public peace’.15 Consequently, the ordinary meaning of threat to peace means a 
person or thing likely to cause damage or danger to freedom from disturbance, 
whereas breach of peace means the disturbance of the public peace.
Furthermore, when we consider the term threat to peace in the context,16 and the 
object and purpose of the UN Charter, we can infer from the Preamble that the use 
of armed force except for common interest is the threat to peace and that tolerance 
and living together in peace with one another as good neighbours will not create 
disturbance to the public peace. Furthermore, the object and purpose of the UN 
Charter is to maintain international peace and security. As well as to solve by peace-
ful means, adjust or settle international disputes or situations, which might lead to a 
breach of the peace. Consequently, the context and object and purpose of the UN 
Charter dictate that threat to peace or breach of peace is any person or thing likely 
to endanger international peace and security or the conduct that disturbs interna-
tional peace and security.
The adoption of the ordinary meaning of the term threat to peace or breach of 
peace does not warrant for the consideration of the supplementary means of inter-
pretation for the purpose of this analysis.
12 University Oxford Press, ‘Oxford Dictionaries – Definition of Threat’ (2017) https://en.oxford-
dictionaries.com/definition/threat accessed 28 July 2017.
13 University Oxford Press, ‘Oxford Dictionaries – Definition of Peace’ (2017) https://en.oxford-
dictionaries.com/definition/peace accessed 28 July 2017.
14 University Oxford Press, ‘Oxford Dictionaries – Breach’ (2017) https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/breach accessed 28 July 2017.
15 Collins, ‘Collins Dictionary – Breach of Peace’ (2017) https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dic-
tionary/english/breach-of-the-peace accessed 28 July 2017.
16 The context of the UN Charter comprise of the text, including its preamble and annexes:
 (a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty.
 (b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. As provided 
in Article 31 paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention.
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3.3  Existence of Threat to Peace or Breach of Peace
How does the Security Council determine the existence of threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace and act of aggression? The determination of the existence of 
threat to peace or breach of peace is left to the discretion of the Security Council. As 
a result, the threat to peace or breach of peace is what the Security Council says it 
is. Therefore, the Security Council can classify any situation as the threat to peace 
or breach of peace. At the inception of the UN, war was determined as a threat to 
peace; however, it is also relevant to consider that it was after the Cold War that new 
challenges and conflicts arose. For instance, the Security Council adopted several 
Resolutions determining the existence of threat to peace, which included serious 
violations of human rights, lack of democracy and anti-terrorist interventions as 
threat to peace.17
Therefore, the inference to be drawn is that any situation can be classified as 
threat to peace nowadays, because the circumstances that led to the conclusion of 
the UN Charter in 1945 were different compared to the ones arising in the twenty- 
first century.
3.4  International Peace and Security Under the OST
Similar to the UN Charter, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, herein referred to as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) does not con-
tain the definition of the term peace. In addition, as discussed earlier, the Vienna 
Convention does not apply to the Outer Space Treaty in strict sense because the 
latter was concluded before the former came into entry. But as mentioned previ-
ously, the Vienna Convention principles of interpretation have accrued the status of 
rules of customary international law. Therefore, the ordinary meaning assigned to 
the term peace in the preceding section will be used throughout the paper.
In the context of Outer Space Treaty, the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, should be carried out in accordance 
with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and security and promoting international coopera-
tion and understanding.18 In addition, the Outer Space Treaty stresses that ‘the Moon 
and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively 
17 Mónica Lourdes de la Serna Galván, ‘Interpretation of Article 39 of the UN Charter (Threat to 
the Peace) by the Security Council. Is the Security Council a Legislator for the Entire International 
Community?’ (2011) XI AnuarioI Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 166–172.
18 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UNOOSA (1966), entered into force 10 Oct. 
1967, Art. III.
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for peaceful purposes’.19 The principle that outer space should be used for peaceful 
purposes is applicable to non-State parties to the OST on the basis that it is a rule of 
customary international law that is binding on international community in general.
Consequently, the OST furthers the object and purpose of the UN Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. As well as the reiteration that if a 
situation arise in the exploration and use of outer space that is a threat to peace or 
breach of peace, then the Security Council can take necessary measures to maintain 
or restore international peace and security, including the determination that the 
exploration and use of outer space in the manner that is contrary to the principle 
outline within the OST amounts to threat to peace or breach of peace.
3.5  Intentional Destruction of Satellites Vis-à-vis Threat 
to Peace or Breach of Peace
Now, the intentional destruction of a satellite as a threat to peace or breach of peace 
will be the focus of this section. However a brief background will be provided on 
the issue of intentional destruction of satellites before we address the issue that the 
Security Council should determine that it (intentional destruction of satellites) exists 
as a threat to peace or breach of peace.
It is common cause that both the United States and the Russian Federation (for-
mer USSR) developed or renewed interest to develop antisatellite (ASAT) and mis-
sile defence systems in the 1950s–1960s, 1960s–1970s, 1980s–1990s and 2000s.20 
Now it is not the purpose of this analysis to go through the historical evolution of 
antisatellite weaponry, but China’s ASAT test will be discussed briefly because it 
correlates with the purpose of this discussion. On 11 January 2007, at 5:28 pm EST, 
the PRC conducted its first successful direct ascent antisatellite (ASAT) weapons 
test, launching a ballistic missile armed with a kinetic kill vehicle (not an exploding 
conventional or nuclear warhead) to destroy the PRC’s Fengyun-1C weather satel-
lite at about 530 miles up in low Earth orbit (LEO) in space. The PLA conducted the 
test near China’s Xichang Space Center in Sichuan province.21
As the result, in its resolution 62/217 of 22 December 2007, the General 
Assembly endorsed the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and agreed that the voluntary guidelines for the 
mitigation of space debris reflected the existing practices as developed by a number 
of national and international organizations and invited Member States to implement 
those guidelines through relevant national mechanisms.22
19 Ibid. art. IV, para.2.
20 Laura Grego, ‘A History of Anti-Satellite Program’ (2012) www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/
space-security/a-history-of-anti-satellite-programs accessed 28 July 2017.
21 Shirley Kan, ‘China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test. In Congressional Research Services Report 
for Congress’ (2007) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf accessed 25 July 2017.
22 UNCOPUOS, ‘Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space’ (2010) p iv.
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Of particular importance is Guideline 4 that provides for the avoidance of the 
intentional destruction of any on-orbit spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages. 
Now, these guidelines are not legally binding yet; however, they can acquire the 
status of customary international law through State practice and opinion juris (sense 
of obligation).
Taking into account the ordinary meaning of the term threat to peace, it implies 
that intentional destruction of satellites can cause damage or danger, and the con-
duct can create disturbance of the public peace. Public, in this sense, means the 
international community. Consequently, intentional destruction of satellites disturbs 
the tranquillity that the international community enjoys in the exploration and use 
of outer space. Furthermore, the fragments that are generated from intentional 
destruction of satellites constitute a danger or the potential to cause damage to the 
satellites of other innocent bystanders. Therefore, no State can be at peace knowing 
that its satellites are at risk of exposure to danger as the result of intentional destruc-
tion of satellites.
The intentional destruction of satellites is equivalent to a person discharging a 
firearm at a public place. Such conduct is punishable under municipal laws even if 
the accused is the lawful owner of the firearm. The mere conduct of the accused 
disturbs public peace. Therefore, the same treatment can be assigned to the inten-
tional destruction of satellites because such conduct is inconsistent with the object 
and purpose of the UN Charter. Secondly, it disturbs international community in the 
peaceful exploration and use of outer space.
Hence, the Security Council should exercise the discretion conferred to it under 
Article 39 of the UN Charter and determine that the intentional destruction of satel-
lites is a threat to peace or breach of peace. The very fact that the exploration and 
use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law includ-
ing the UN Charter, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security, 
is clear evidence that activities carried in outer space that threaten peace should be 
resolved by the Security Council by exercising the powers conferred to under Article 
41. Thus, once the Security Council decides that intentional destruction of satellites 
is indeed a threat to peace, it should impose sanctions on the States that intentionally 
destroy satellites. Consequently, the Security Council can be the solution for an 
enforcement mechanism of space debris created through intentional destruction of 
satellites.
The deliberate destruction of satellites contributes to space debris or, to use the 
language of the Rescue Agreement,23 space objects or component parts that are 
reasonably believed to be of hazardous or deleterious nature by a contracting 
party.24 This will not make outer space sustainable in the long run, and the danger 
posed by space debris to manned and unmanned space missions cannot be overem-
phasized. Therefore, the determination that intentional destruction of satellites is a 
23 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, UNOOSA (1967), entered into force 3 December 1968.
24 Ibid. art.5, para.4.
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threat to peace will contribute significantly to efforts for the sustainable use of outer 
space. However, the only challenge that will be faced with such efforts is the fact 
that the key permanent members of the Security Council, namely, China, Russia and 
the United States, have the capability of antisatellite weapons. Thus, this will result 
in the permanent members to exercise the right to veto any effort to determine that 
deliberate destruction of satellites constitutes threat to peace. In such circumstances, 
the Security Council permanent members are not there to further the object and 
purpose, i.e. maintenance of international peace and security.
Therefore, the permanent members of the Security Council should put aside their 
individual interest and determine that intentional destruction of satellites is a threat 
to peace or breach of peace. Breach of peace in the sense that destroying satellites 
deliberately disturbs the peace that the international community enjoys which is 
contrary to the principle that the exploration and use of outer space should be done 
for peaceful purposes as enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty. The mere fact that a 
State destroys its own satellite is no justification because the consequences are dire, 
in particular the sustainability of outer space, let alone the huge danger posed or 
potential damage to be caused by the fragments of destroyed satellites. Such con-
duct should not be condoned by the Security Council because it will be grounds for 
justification for other States to carry out similar acts.
3.6  Conclusion
In conclusion, the Security Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security. And the carrying out of activities in the exploration 
and use of outer should be done in the interest of maintaining international peace 
and security. Hence, intentional destruction of satellites is a threat to peace and is 
not within the interest of maintaining international peace and security.
The Outer Space Treaty’s principle of peaceful exploration was formulated for 
the purpose of ensuring that armed conflict experienced at terrestrial level should 
not be expanded to the outer space. This is supported by partial demilitarization of 
outer space, in particular the prohibition of placing nuclear weapons or weapons of 
mass destruction in the orbit around the Earth, installing nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction or establishing and fortifying military bases on celes-
tial bodies.
Consequently, the relation between the Outer Space Treaty and the UN Charter 
is that the former recognizes the primary object of maintaining international peace 
and security in the exploration and use of outer space that is main purpose (main-
taining international peace and security) for which the international community 
established the United Nations. Thus, the international community realized the 
great threat posed to humanity or mankind if the terrestrial armed conflict was to 
escalate into outer space. Thus, the OST should or ought not to be inconsistent with 
the object and purpose of the UN Charter. As a result, the exploration and use of 
outer space should be for peaceful purposes; otherwise the use of outer space for 
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purposes other than peaceful ones will be contrary to international law, and in par-
ticular the Charter of the United Nations, and will not be in the interest of maintain-
ing international peace and security. This is the overarching principle on which the 
United Nations was built.
In the final analysis, one of the challenges faced by the Outer Space Treaty is the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms for violations of treaty obligations. Therefore, the 
SC is the right platform to impose enforcement measures for violations of treaty 
obligations that are not in the interest of maintaining international peace and secu-
rity. The very fact that the SC’s primary responsibility is to maintain international 
peace and security, conferred to it by the Members of the United Nations, implies 
that there is no institution better placed than the SC to impose enforcement mea-
sures in instances where the exploration and use of outer space is not in the interest 
of maintaining international peace and security. Furthermore, the SC has before 
exercised its discretion to determine several situations as a threat to peace or breach 
of peace, and it imposed economic sanctions for threat to peace or breach of peace. 
Therefore, it is the best option to decide that intentional destruction of satellites is a 
threat to peace or breach of peace. And such conduct is neither in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and security nor does it amount to peaceful explora-
tion and use of the moon and celestial bodies as required by the Outer Space Treaty.
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Chapter 4
Peacekeeping Operations in Outer Space: 
Contradictions in Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty
Eduardo Bressel Baratto
Abstract All the States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty recognize the common 
interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for 
peaceful purposes. However, let us imagine a futuristic scenario where terrorists or 
tyrants had access to space and began to unleash terror in a space colony. What 
would be possible to do from a legal point of view?
Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN 
on Earth to maintain peace and security in those countries where peace is far from 
being achieved. But will it also be a useful tool in outer space? The fact is that the 
current text of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prevents such operations through 
a series of contradictions within its content.
4.1  Introduction
The Outer Space Treaty is without any doubt the cornerstone of research and space 
exploration. It is the tree from which the different UN space treaties emanate as if 
they were branches. It establishes the principles by which all space activities, either 
governmental or private, should be governed.
It is a treaty that has as many sympathizers as detractors. There are those who 
believe that it is an old, obsolete and completely outdated treaty to the current real-
ity. But, is it necessary to update a 50-year-old treaty? The truth is that the growth 
of the space industry is unprecedented. Each year the development of new technol-
ogy allows us to reach goals that were unthinkable for the human being. Fifty years 
ago, we looked at the Moon as the last frontier; now we are looking forward to find-
ing life on Mars. Where will we be in the next 50 years?
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On the one hand, I believe the Outer Space Treaty has a solid base. It establishes 
very well-defined principles, which allows a magnificent international cooperation 
between nations for the exploration of space. In addition, I would say that it is a 
visionary treaty, which looks towards the future.
On the other hand, regulations and treaties should be updated to new realities. 
The human being undergoes many changes in the different stages of their life. Most 
of these changes are products of external agents of the society in which they live. 
Consumerisms, technology, new trends and trade, among others, affect the individ-
ual, directly or indirectly, forcing them constantly to change. According to Darwin’s 
Origin of Species, it is not the most intellectual of the species that survives; it is not 
the strongest that survives; but the species that survives is the one that is able best 
to adapt and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds itself.1 In the same 
way that the human being has to adapt to social changes, the law must as well.
However, this is not so simple. A treaty may be amended by the agreement of the 
Parties. Every Party to a treaty is entitled to participate in the amendment’s negotia-
tions and to become a Party to the new amendment. Parties are not required to adopt 
amendments. In fact, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (part IV), the pre-amendment terms remain binding for any Party that does 
not adopt the amendment, even in dealings with a Party that is bound by the 
amendment.
Nevertheless, it is true that there are several points in the Outer Space Treaty that 
could be adapted to the new economic, industrial and social reality in which we live. 
In this analysis, the focus will be on the possibility of carrying out peacekeeping 
operations for the maintenance of peace and security in outer space.
4.2  Peaceful Purposes in Outer Space
As it is well known, one of the general principles which must be present in all space 
activities is that the use and exploration of outer space shall be for the benefit of all 
countries and shall be in accordance with international law, including the Charter of 
the United Nations, with the interest of maintaining international peace and securi-
ty.2 Everything that has to do with peace and international security is more than 
welcome, but do we know what it means to maintain international peace? And, what 
do we mean by security?
In the field of law, every concept has to be defined and differentiated. In the 
world of criminal law, it is very important to distinguish between murder and homi-
cide, rape and sexual aggression and kidnapping and unlawful detention. In space 
law it should not be any different. All concepts would have to be defined for a better 
1 Leon C. Megginson, “Lessons from Europe for American Business” [1963] The Southwestern 
Social Science Quarterly, 4.
2 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1967 Article 3 (1).
E.B. Baratto
annette.froehlich@espi.or.at
41
understanding of the treaties. For example a proper definition of the concept “Space 
Object” would solve many legal doubts, e.g. the legal framework of suborbital 
flights and the legal framework for the launch of satellites with unmanned free bal-
loons, since these are considered aircrafts according to the Chicago Convention, and 
therefore Air Law must be applied in those activities that are carried out with 
balloons.
All the States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty recognize the common interest of 
all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful 
purposes. Nevertheless, the concept “peaceful purposes” could have many mean-
ings. We could understand “peaceful” as devoid of violence or force3 or not willing 
to take part in war or violence.4 And “purpose” could be understood as the reason 
for which something exists or is done. Therefore, “peaceful purposes” could mean 
that all the actions that are carried out must be done without the use of violence or 
force. The term “force” is frequently associated with something bad and cruel, but 
the truth is that peace and force hardly ever exist without each other.
However, not all the nations in the world share the same concept of “peaceful”. 
There are countries where peace is not known, let alone security, places where the 
evil of the human being is the model of government. To assist those countries where 
peace is far from being achieved, peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most 
effective tools available to the UN.5 The UN Charter gives the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.6 This 
responsibility is not only applicable on the planet Earth, but it also has application 
to be extended to all places where the human being is, e.g. the Moon, Mars, etc.
In fulfilling this responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the Council can establish a UN peacekeeping operation.7
4.3  United Nations Peacekeeping
United Nations peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized 
the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East.8 Since then 69 peace-
keeping operations have been deployed by the UN, 56 of them since 1988. Over the 
years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel, as well as tens of thousands of 
3 “Merriam-Webster” (n.d.) https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peaceful. Accessed 16 
June 2017.
4 “Macmillan Dictionary” (n.d.) http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/violence. 
Accessed 16 June 2017.
5 UN Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml
6 Charter of the United Nations 1945 s Chapter 5 (Article 24)(1).
7 ‘Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping’ (United Nations Peacekeeping) http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml. Accessed 1 July 2017.
8 “History of peacekeeping” (United Nations Peacekeeping) http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
operations/history.shtml. Accessed 1 July 2017.
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UN police and other civilians from more than 120 countries, have participated in 
UN peacekeeping operations. More than 3326 UN peacekeepers from some 120 
countries have died while serving under the UN flag.
In theory, these missions to maintain peace must not be enforcement operations. 
However, the United Nations itself recognizes that situations can arise where the use 
of military force is necessary.
Peacekeeping operations are aimed at preserving peace in contexts of tension, 
for instance, in countries where the war has already ended by signing a peace agree-
ment and conditions established therein. These operations require the consent of the 
parties and use force only in self-defence.
However, it is impossible to maintain peace where it does not exist. Therefore, 
there are other types of missions whose purpose is the establishment or imposition 
of peace. These are peacemaking operations and peace-enforcement operations.
In the first place, peacemaking operations have the objective of pacifying an 
unstable situation and getting the parties to reach a global agreement by peaceful 
means. Its paradigm was the United Nations operation in Namibia in 1989–1990, 
having subsequently conducted similar operations in El Salvador, Angola, Cambodia 
and Mozambique.
Secondly, peace-enforcement operations do not have the consent of the State in 
which they operate and contemplate the active use of force to impose a certain man-
date of the Security Council, such as the cases of UNOSOM II9 and UNPROFOR,10 
for instance.
Even though these operations are not carried out in the same way, all of them are 
carried out with the aim of achieving peace. Therefore, they should be considered as 
“peaceful purposes”.
As we can see, there are situations where “peaceful purposes” may include the 
use of force and therefore the use of an army. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty 
states that States Parties to the Treaty must not undertake to make use of nuclear 
weapons or weapons of mass destruction. The installations of military bases, forti-
fications or any type of military manoeuvre in a celestial body are also forbidden.
After reading the content of this article, a question comes to mind: How will it be 
legally possible to carry out peacekeeping operations in which the use of military 
force is necessary in outer space, if it is not possible to install military bases and 
carry out military manoeuvres to deal with those countries that choose not to respect 
the resolutions of the United Nations?
9 United Nations Operation in Somalia II.
10 United Nations Protection Force in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav 
Wars.
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4.4  United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Outer Space
Even though colonization of space has not begun, it may be necessary at some point 
to carry out peacekeeping missions in outer space.
The fact is that the United Nations already foresaw this scenario, including a 
small phrase that may go unnoticed in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty: “The 
use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes 
shall not be prohibited”. This Article IV is a clear sign of the futurist vision that this 
treaty has.
With this in mind, it seems peacekeeping operations could be utilized in outer 
space. Right now, access to outer space for civilians is quite difficult and expensive. 
But this fact is changing, since the development of technology and cost reduction in 
rocket launches will allow us to have the first colonies along our solar system in less 
than 100 years. Now, let’s imagine a futuristic scenario where terrorists or tyrants 
had access to space and began to unleash terror in one of these colonies. What 
would be possible to do from a legal point of view?
To carry out a peacekeeping operation in outer space would be legally difficult. 
The reason why is because, when analysing Article IV in depth, there are three con-
tradictions in its content. On the one hand, this article allows the use of military 
personnel for peaceful or scientific uses. On the other hand, the use of nuclear weap-
ons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as the installation of military bases 
and fortifications, and the military manoeuvres are totally prohibited. To explain 
this contradiction, it is necessary to analyse point by point the prohibitions found in 
this article.
4.5  Article IV Prohibitions
Within the content of Article IV, two different prohibitions can be found. The first 
prohibition applies to the installation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction. The second one prohibits the establishment of military bases, installa-
tions and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of mili-
tary manoeuvres on celestial bodies.
The main objective of Article IV is to partially avoid the militarization of space, 
partially because it only prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons and weapons 
of mass destruction, leaving unregulated antisatellite weapons (ASAT), already 
used by the United States and China, or any other type of weapon that cannot be 
classified in the two categories mentioned. Saying that outer space is only used for 
peaceful purposes and for the good of mankind is to obviate reality. Outer space 
supposes a completely revolutionary advance in military matter. It allows to observe, 
to listen and to direct the movements of the military forces. Having “spy” satellites 
is a strategic advantage over the enemy. The concept of war has completely changed. 
The objective is no longer to take the territory of the enemy but to strike precise 
4 Peacekeeping Operations in Outer Space: Contradictions in Article IV of the Outer…
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blows in its weak points. Space war is not an idea, but it is a reality. General John 
E. Hyten, US commander of Air Force Space Command, said: “We have to deter 
bad behaviour in space and we have to deter conflict in space”,11 referring to China 
and Russia as potential troublemakers. General Hyten claimed that “in the not-so- 
distant future” Moscow and Beijing will be able to threaten every spacecraft the 
United States has in space. “We have to prevent that”, Hyten said, “and the best way 
to prevent war is to be prepared for war. So the United States is going to do that, and 
we’re going to make sure that everybody knows we’re prepared for war”.
4.5.1  Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The prohibition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction does not war-
rant attention in this analysis since they will never be used in peacekeeping mis-
sions. It is true however that following some national regulations, for example, 
United States regulation, we could say that weapons of mass destruction have been 
used previously in some UN peacekeeping operations.
The US regulation defines these weapons as12 “any destructive device as defined 
in Section 921; any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious 
bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous 
chemicals, or their precursors; any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or 
vector; or any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level 
dangerous to human life”.
The already mentioned Section 921 also includes bombs as weapons of mass 
destruction. It appears that during the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, from 
1960 to 1964, the UN made use of Indian bombers to destroy airfields used by mer-
cenaries.13 According to US legislation, this attack with bombers could be consid-
ered as an attack with weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, this is a bit tricky 
since other UN countries have other conceptions about this weaponry.
Unfortunately, we live in a world that requires weapons to guarantee peace and 
security. Moreover, in our world, peace can be maintained by inspiring fear in the 
mind of the adversary. The point is to inflict so much fear on the other side that they 
will either give in or resist from taking the first shot.14 That is the reason why some 
nations decided to start with nuclear programmes. It is hard to say, but the existence 
11 Cheryl Pellerin, “Hyten: Deterrence in Space Means No War Will be Fought There” [2017] 
Department of Defense, DoD News, Defense Media Activity https://www.defense.gov/News/
Article/Article/1061833/hyten-deterrence-in-space-means-no-war-will-be-fought-there/. 
Accessed 3 July 2017.
12 According to U.S.  Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, §2332a  – Use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).
13 A. Walter Dorn, Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (Ashgate Publishing, New York) 1.
14 Debájit Sarkar, Subject Matter Expert – Smart Weapons & Unmanned Vehicle Systems.
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of nuclear weapons could be the reason why we are not having a third world war as 
they create a geopolitical equilibrium, which may not bring peace, but stability.
4.5.2  Establishment of Military Bases in Outer Space
Following with the analysis of Article IV, we are faced with the second prohibition: 
“The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, …. shall be 
forbidden”.
According to the UN, peacekeeping operations are rarely limited to one type of 
activity.15 While deployed in the context of a political framework supporting a peace 
agreement or in the context of creating the conditions for a return to stability, peace-
keeping missions may require the use of force, particularly in situations where the 
host State is unable to provide security and maintain public order.
To meet these complex peacekeeping challenges, military components often play 
a pivotal role in providing and maintaining a secure environment. Under these cir-
cumstances, the deployment of a UN Force Headquarters Support Unit can contrib-
ute decisively by providing security and essential administrative support to the 
Force Headquarters and military installations. The establishment of a headquarters 
(HQ) or an operations centre is essential for the success of the mission. From there, 
the planning of the operations and the logistical support is carried out.
Some examples of headquarters in UN missions could be the headquarters in 
Juba, South Sudan, for UNMISS16 operation, and the headquarters in Kinshasa, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for MONUSCO17 operation. The mis-
sion views the DRC as consisting of six sectors, each with its own staff headquar-
ters; the Blue Beret Camp, on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus, is a base camp 
and headquarters located on the west side of the city of Nicosia, which forms the 
headquarters of the UNFICYP.18
These examples denote the need to establish military installations, whether they 
are headquarters or advanced quarters to carry out patrols, etc. This need clashes 
with the prohibition contained in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. Therefore, 
there is a contradiction as it is possible to use military personnel for peaceful pur-
poses, but military bases cannot be established in outer space.
15 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008s 2 (2.2)(1).
16 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan.
17 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
18 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
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4.5.3  Military Manoeuvres in Outer Space
Last but not least is the prohibition of carrying out military manoeuvres: According 
to Article IV, “the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be for-
bidden”. First we need to understand the concept of military manoeuvres to see how 
it is being contradicted.
A good example is how Malaysian law defines this concept. A military manoeu-
vre means “any deployment of service personnel, guns, vehicles, ships or aircraft 
carried out on any land, sea, tidal water, shore or air by the armed forces or any of 
the visiting forces”.19
Curiously, Article 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations con-
templates the need to carry out military manoeuvres: “Should the Security Council 
consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have 
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may 
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action 
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the United Nations”.
Here again we find the same contradiction as mentioned in the previous section, 
since the use of military personnel will be permitted for peaceful purposes in outer 
space, but military manoeuvres will not be allowed. Even though military personnel 
are used only for peaceful purposes in outer space, a military manoeuvre is indeed 
necessary to deploy such personnel.
The content of Article IV is not completely wrong, but needs to be rephrased. 
Below I propose an updated text for Article IV, which includes the possibility of 
establishing military bases and carrying out military manoeuvres, as long as the UN 
Security Council authorizes it.
4.6  Conclusion
For the time being, international cooperation and peace prevail in outer space. 
Nations cooperate in its exploration and use. But, will it continue to be so in the 
future? We have not even begun to make use of all its applications. What will hap-
pen when nations begin with space mining or with the establishment of colonies 
along the solar system? In that case the problem will not be who arrives first, but 
who arrives second. Will the nations be willing to share the resources with a 
newcomer?
This does not mean we should disagree with the use of space with a lucrative 
spirit, including the extraction of natural resources. But we should not turn our 
backs on reality, and the truth is that the extraction of natural resources has triggered 
conflicts throughout the history of mankind. For the last 60 years, over 40% of civil 
19 Military Manoeuvres Act 1983s Act 295 (1).
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conflicts have been connected with natural resources.20 What is currently happening 
in the South China Sea is a clear example of conflict in connection with the extrac-
tion of natural resources. Natural resources are a very important source of national 
income for many countries. In addition, if they are used effectively, they can provide 
jobs, infrastructure and livelihoods to local populations. Space mining could be, in 
the not-so-distant future, a source of conflicts between space actors.
Article IV is a really good attempt to achieve peace and stability in outer space. 
The prohibition of using weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons is, with-
out any reasonable doubt, necessary and non-negotiable. However, the installation 
of military bases and military manoeuvres could be necessary, since the more space 
actors there are, the more possibilities of conflict exist. It is necessary to understand 
that space has ceased to be a place of exclusive actions for nations and space agen-
cies. The private sector has arrived and is striking very hard with projects of great 
proportions.
The ultimate goal of this analysis is to seek improvement of the Outer Space 
Treaty; it is useless to criticize if solutions are not provided. Therefore, here is a 
proposed updated text for Article IV which contemplates the possibility of estab-
lishing military bases and carrying out military manoeuvres, as long as it is autho-
rized by the United Nations Security Council:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any 
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer 
space in any other manner. The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by 
all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The testing of 
any type of weapons shall also be forbidden.
The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, and the conduct 
of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies for peaceful purposes shall be prohib-
ited, unless it is authorised by the United Nations Security Council.
The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful pur-
poses shall not be prohibited.
The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon 
and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
In this way, the original prohibitions would be maintained, but the door would be 
left open to possible peacekeeping operations in outer space, in case they were 
needed. As John F. Kennedy said, “Change is the law of life. And those who look 
only to the past or present are certain to miss the future”. If we wait for something 
to happen to start regulating it, we will always be late.
20 United Nations Environment Programme, “Addressing the Role of Natural Resources in Conflict 
and Peacebuilding” [2015].
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Chapter 5
Wild Military Operations in Outer Space: 
A Sword of Damocles Hanging over the Future 
of Space Environment and Space Activities
Matteo Frigoli
Abstract This analysis will discuss the way in which the Outer Space Treaty faces 
the contemporary challenges of the expansion of militarization of outer space. 
Military and geopolitical reasons seem to freely dominate the outer space dimen-
sion. An examination of the relevant issues of the contemporary scenario is given 
before analyzing the legal framework in place. The Outer Space Treaty was drafted 
for the purpose of proscribing norms to an area that was without law. This legal 
regime was destined to confront the evolution of outer space technology especially 
in the military field. This assumption contains the premise of the proposal to reas-
sess the nature of the Outer Space Treaty as a ductile legal framework and to set out 
a hierarchy based on the interpretation of Article IX of the Treaty.
5.1  Space Technology Progress: Expanding Sinkhole 
in Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty1 is the basic legal framework of international space law, 
providing also the most relevant regulatory regime as far as the military utilization 
of outer space is concerned. It has been considered as a quasi-constitutional treaty.2 
According to Robinson and White, in fact “[the Outer Space Treaty] is a quasi- 
constitution, not only culmination, but also an initiation.”3 The principles it contains 
are indeed the foundation of the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, 
1 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 UNTS 205 (Outer Space Treaty).
2 J. I. Gabrynowicz, “The Outer Space Treaty and enhancing space security,” UNIDIR, Building 
the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security: Conference Report 30–31 March 2006.
3 George S. Robinson, Harold M. White, Envoys of Mankind: A Declaration of First Principles 
for the Governance of Space Societies (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986) at 181.
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and the Astronaut Rescue Agreement.4 Although the intent of this research is much 
more limited than an analysis of the Outer Space Treaty, it relates to the fundamen-
tal assumption that space represents the apogee of what combat commanders have 
sought for centuries: “the high ground.”5 But at the same time, it represents a key 
factor for scientific and economic development, affecting the standards of living of 
the individuals. In this context, the norms of the Outer Space Treaty will be con-
fronted with the essential premise that “wild” military operations in outer space 
could be a definitive threat to future space activities, making outer space similar to 
a “toxic” environment.
With this purpose in mind, this analysis will first take into account:
 1. The fast evolution of space-related technology
 2. The underlying issue that outer space has always been militarized and this pro-
cess is not reversible6
 3. The unbounded prominence of military outer space activities
5.1.1  Fast Evolution and Articulation of Space-Related 
Technology
This aspect is particularly relevant because it affects the other two circumstances 
mentioned above. As a result of the increased accessibility of space technology, 
space assets and space actors have deeply diversified. In the 1960s, when the Outer 
Space Treaty was drafted, the only effective space actors were the United States of 
America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In the 1980s, 
building and launching a satellite was the remit of a few developed countries with 
massive industrial capabilities. Nowadays, many more countries and private compa-
nies are engaged in space-related activities, a trend that is expected to further 
develop in the coming years.7 Though, the regulatory regime of outer space has not 
kept the pace with the underneath evolution of space technology.
Nowadays, everyday life would be unthinkable without reliable satellites orbit-
ing in space. Phones, personal data devices, radios, and televisions, in one way or 
another, rely on satellites for the transmission of the information that flows to and 
from them. Most of air, sea, and land vehicles use the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) for precise location and navigation. Weather forecasters would be 
4 Gabrynowicz (n.2).
5 M.  N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space, in A. von Bogdandy, 
R. Wolfrum (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (vol. 10, 2006, Brill Academic 
Publishers).
6 Anél Ferreira-Snyman “Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer 
Space, with Specific Reference to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty” (2015) 18(3) 
POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 488; Johannes M. Wolff “‘Peaceful uses’ of outer space has 
permitted its militarization: does it also mean its weaponization?” (2003) Disarmament Forum 5.
7 oecd, The Space Economy at a Glance 2014 (2014, oecd publishing).
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 compromised without satellite’s information, and the same is true for international 
money transactions.
Moreover, most of space assets, such as communications, observation, and sur-
veillance satellites, may be exploited for both military and non-military purposes. 
As it will be better discussed, dual-use capacity poses hard challenges in regulating 
military uses of outer space, since civilian and military assets have become increas-
ingly intertwined and therefore any attempt to prohibit military uses of outer space 
would be futile.
5.1.2  Outer Space Has Always Been a Militarized Environment
Outer space became a matter of national security since the launch of the first satel-
lite. Military and strategic considerations have been – and will continue to be – the 
main reasons why states access outer space. As it has been correctly observed: 
“Space has always been militarized. Military considerations were at the heart of the 
original efforts to enter space and have remained so to the present day.”8 Due to its 
unique features, outer space offers crucial advantages to war fighters; for example, 
it offers persistency of coverage, space objects move at extremely high speed 
because of orbital mechanics, and there is no point in the earth’s surface or in the 
airspace which cannot be observed from outer space.9 During the Cold War, the 
USA and the USSR invested huge resources in their respective space programs, 
causing the so-called space race in which the space arms race involved both the 
evolution of space-asset capabilities and of the technology to destroy or deny those 
capabilities through antisatellite weapons (ASAT). In this last regard, from now on, 
it should be clear what is meant by “militarization” and “weaponization” of outer 
space.
The militarization of outer space may be described as the passive military use of 
outer space. This includes activities in which satellites are not part of a direct 
engagement in warfare, playing a non-aggressive role with an indirect military 
value. For example, satellite positioning, reconnaissance, or surveillance systems 
are traditionally considered a passive military use of outer space.
On the other side, weaponization of outer space regards activities in which space 
assets are part of a direct engagement in warfare, described as “the deployment of 
weapons of an offensive nature in outer space or on the ground with their intended 
target located in space.”10 The weaponization of space through antisatellite weapons 
represents a growing threat and the simplest way to make outer space a battlefield, 
making the idea of space warfare day by day more real.
8 Ferreira-Snyman (n.6).
9 Schmitt (n.5) at 94.
10 Ferreira-Snyman (n.6) quoting Fabio Tronchetti “A Soft Law Approach to Prevent the 
Weaponisation of Outer Space” in Irmgard Marboe (ed.) Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function 
of Non-binding Norms in International Space Law (Böhlau Verlag 2012) 361–386.
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In this scenario, dual-use capacity of space assets shall be concisely considered. 
Civilian and military space missions typically share launch pads, launch vehicles, 
space platforms, and satellites. The same technology could serve for military or 
civilian purposes, making a distinction impracticable. In fact, because of this dual- 
purpose approach, military and civilian space assets have become too intertwined to 
the point that a demilitarization of outer space could mean the impossibility to use 
outer space at all. For example, GPS systems can be used for civilian purposes but 
also to guide gravity bombs to targets.11 This assumption leads also to the question 
if a dual-use satellite could be lawfully targeted by antisatellite weapons during a 
conflict, adding complexity to the matter.
Antisatellite weapons are particularly relevant both legally and factually since 
this technology is now relatively easy to achieve. Moreover, the effects of their uti-
lization represent a vital danger for the outer space environment and for space activ-
ities. For a better understanding and due to the significance that ASAT weapons 
have in relation to the Outer Space Treaty and, more broadly, for the outer space 
environment, each type of these technologies will now be briefly canvassed.
Antisatellite weapons are primarily kinetic energy weapons, including standard 
missiles and co-orbital ASATs which rely on a physical object shot up from earth 
which either collides with the target satellite, destroying it via high-speed impact, or 
approaches it closely enough to blow up both itself and the target via a suicidal 
explosion.12 The USA, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia have all demon-
strated military ASAT capability. Such capability is within the grasp of many other 
States, given the accessible nature of the technology underpinning the modified 
standard missiles used.13
Secondly, ASAT weapons are directed energy weapons. These technologies 
include, for example, an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), which is basically an elec-
tromagnetic shock wave, created by a nuclear explosion in space or by an electro-
magnetic bomb (E-BOMB),14 a laser beam, a column of subatomic particles, 
radio-frequency transmissions, or a microwave generator. These devices could burn 
a fatal hole in the satellite’s skin, temporarily or permanently blind its sensors, or 
possibly employ cyber warfare to alter the satellite’s on-board computers, switching 
it off or even commandeering it for the attacker’s own uses.15
11 Earl D. Matthews “U.S. Space Systems: A Critical Strength and Vulnerability” (Ph.D. Diss., 
Newport, RI, Naval War College, 1996).
12 David A. Koplow, “ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-
Satellite Weapons, in Michigan Journal of International Law” (2009) 30(4) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1187.
13 Dale Stephens, Cassandra Steer, “Conflicts in Space: International Humanitarian Law and 
Its Application to Space Warfare” (2015) 40 McGill Annals of Air and Space Law 1. Available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2722315.
14 Ibid; Carlo Kopp, “The E-Bomb: a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction” Proceedings of 
InfoWarCon V, Washington, DC, September 1996.
15 Koplow (n.12).
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One major feature that distinguishes kinetic and directed energy ASATs is the 
creation of space debris.16 The destructive effect of kinetic ASATs is achieved 
through the direct collision between the interceptor and the target, generating thou-
sands of space debris destined to orbit around the earth at enormous velocities. Even 
small fragments could cause catastrophic damage.
This issue, as will be further discussed, constitutes an essential challenge both 
for the legal framework of Outer Space Treaty and, in a broader sense, for the future 
space activities.
5.1.3  Unbounded Prominence of Military Outer Space 
Activities
The 21st century will prove to be the race for space. Space-based systems are the key 
enablers of national and international infrastructures of today and tomorrow. The current 
speed of technological developments indicates the pace of diffusion of technology with 
some form of dependence on space-related hardware will only accelerate. Accordingly, 
outer space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.17
Almost every space-related technology has a high military value. As it was 
observed: “Space superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win a war without 
controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space.”18 Space assets have 
proven their capabilities in warfare since the 1991 Gulf War, when communications, 
navigation, surveillance, and weather information were provided by satellites to 
national command authorities, providing a definitive advantage in the combat are-
na.19 Space support acts as a force multiplier ensuring dominance in the battlefield.
But while, on the one hand, space systems become more integrated with the 
mechanisms of war, on the other hand, the essential space support turned out to be 
also a manifest weakness. Militaries with developed space capabilities have grown 
a strong reliance toward space assets in association with the awareness that during 
a conflict, the adversaries will try to deny their linkage to space.
This is even more relevant considering the vulnerability of space assets. In fact, 
satellites are “soft” targets. They are unshielded (even micrometeoroids could dam-
age satellites due to orbital high speed),20 and orbits are predictable which makes 
16 “Space debris is defined as all the inactive, manmade objects, including fragments, that are orbit-
ing Earth or reentering the atmosphere” ESA, Space Operations-Space Debris: the ESA Approach 
(March 2017, ESA Production).
17 Nato parliamentary assembly “The space domain and allied defense” (Defense and Security 
Committee, Draft Report - 068 DSCFC 17 E, 20 March 2017).
18 General L.W. Lord, “Space Superiority” (2005) 1 High frontier 3.
19 Earl D. Matthews (n.11).
20 “Micrometeoroids are somewhat of a hazard to spacecraft, although substantially less than once 
imagined. Meteoroid collision events have occurred, but rarely. The two highly probable known 
cases consist of geostationary spacecraft hit by small objects, probably meteoroids. In one case, the 
European Space Agency’s Olympus satellite was lost as it consumed propellant in an attempt to 
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them easy to track. Moreover, they are still relatively few in number with the conse-
quence that destroying or damaging even a handful of them could have a major 
impact. Finally, they are expensive and, accordingly, States and private corporations 
do not maintain standby fleets of spares to rapidly reconstitute a satellite architec-
ture that was suddenly degraded by hostile action.21
Spacefaring nations have perceived the need to protect such a vulnerable and 
critical infrastructure. Renewed attention to ASATs by major spacefaring countries 
gave rise to military doctrines pursuing with different methods, the objective of 
outer space domination. For example, the US Air Force (USAF) categorizes space 
domination as “space superiority” that, through counterspace operations, aims at 
“ensur[ing] the freedom to operate in the space medium while denying the same to 
an adversary and, like air superiority, cannot be taken for granted.”22 China’s army 
had already introduced the concept of “space force strength,” apparently referring to 
the similar military concept conceived by the USA.23
As it has already been mentioned above, the USAF doctrine foresees defensive 
and offensive counterspace operations in order to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy adversary space capabilities.24 It can only be a matter of time before other 
spacefaring countries will develop a same capability to conduct such operations in 
outer space. This evolving scenario could contribute to make the outer space a 
highly delicate “equilibrium.” A coherent clue with this assumption could be the 
recent tests of a supposed space weapon by Russia (though a lot of secrecy sur-
rounds these tests) and India’s recent development of a layered missile defense sys-
tem likely to have the capability (at least in the near-term) of direct-ascent ASAT 
capabilities.25
recover. A Japanese satellite sustained a hit in one solar array, with the only result being a minor 
loss of power generation capacity.” M. D. Griffin, J. R. French Space Vehicle Design (2nd edn. 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2004) pp. 90–93.
21 Koplow (n.12) at 1200.
22 Defense Technical Information Centre, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2–2.1: 
COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS (2004) available at https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2_2-1.
pdf (last visited July 28, 2017).
23 Steven Freeland, Jackson Maogoto, “Space weaponization and the United Nations Charter 
regime on force: a thick legal Fog or a receding Mist?” (2007) 41(4) The international Lawyer 
1091.
24 Defense Technical Information Centre (n.22) pp. 2–27.
25 Nato parliamentary assembly (n.17) pp. 5–6.
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5.2  How a 50-Year-Old Outer Space Treaty Can Avoid 
Today’s Space Warfare: A Proposal
These three circumstances discussed above influence the Outer Space Treaty’s legal 
regime, rendering the regulation of military uses of outer space an extremely ardu-
ous task.
Article IV of the Treaty specifically deals with military activities in outer space, 
contains a “peaceful purposes” clause, and establishes a partial demilitarization of 
outer space. It indeed provides that:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects car-
rying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. 
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifica-
tions, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial 
bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any 
other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility neces-
sary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be 
prohibited.26
Notably, State parties to the Treaty are forbidden to place in orbit around the 
earth any nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction or station such 
weapon in outer space in any manner. The placement in outer space of any other 
kind of weapons, such as antisatellite weapons, or the transit of antiballistic missiles 
and any other kind of rockets through space is not forbidden.27 The “peaceful pur-
poses” clause lacks thus of specificity. However, in the debate between “non- 
military” and “non-aggressive” significance of this provision, the “non-aggressive” 
use of outer space has prevailed.
During the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty, the space powers were 
extremely careful in ensuring that no provision of the Treaty could infringe on their 
plans to allow for limited military uses of outer space, such as permitting intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles to have part of their trajectory in outer space. Other limited 
uses included the so-called “support activities” or passive military uses, through 
satellites reconnaissance, navigation, and surveillance.28 The passive military use of 
outer space has been accepted by the international community, based on the per-
ceived non-aggressive nature of these activities. Such activities are indeed accepted 
as legal by the large majority of States and thus as not contrary to Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter.29 That said, military uses of outer space which are in fact 
26 Art. IV Outer Space Treaty (n.1).
27 Fabio tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy (Springer, 2013) at 9.
28 Detlew Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law (UNIDIR 2005) 
[emphasis added].
29 Art.2(4) of the United Nations Charter provides as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.” United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
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not really peaceful (such as the use of satellites to direct bombing raids) are also 
currently accepted by States.30 Actually, it seems that spacefaring States are chang-
ing their course progressively toward “space weaponization.”
As it has been discussed above, the militaries of space States increasingly rely on 
space assets, and the armed conflicts of the twenty-first century and beyond will 
increasingly involve the utilization of outer space.31
On 11 January 2007, the Chinese military launched an ASAT ballistic missile 
against one of its aging weather satellites of the Fengyun series. The move was 
widely condemned by other States. But it must be noted that the official statement 
of other States rarely raised any objection under international law. As a matter of 
example, a spokesperson for the UK was reported to have said: “We are concerned 
about the impact of debris in space and we expressed that concern […] We don’t 
believe that this does contravene international law.”32
The lack of legal clarity and good faith by space powers allowed military and 
geopolitical interests to fill the legal gaps of the Outer Space Treaty. In this context, 
considering the practice of States, it seems that an aggressive use of space (e.g., 
through ASAT deployment) has evolved from unlawful to unfriendly, putting the 
outer space environment in an extremely delicate state. There are currently 1459 
satellites and millions of space debris orbiting around the earth.33 Estimating a 
growth in the population of space objects, it could be argued that outer space is a 
progressively crowded environment likely to be endangered from an unbound 
utilization.
The interrelation between this circumstance and Article IX of the Outer Space 
Treaty is particularly relevant.
The first sentence provides that in the use and exploration of outer space “States 
Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual 
assistance.” The second sentence significantly points out that “States Parties to the 
Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination 
and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth” and adopt measures for 
this purpose. The third sentence contains a mandatory international consultation 
clause in that if a “State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or 
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities 
of other States Parties” or “a State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe 
that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, 
 including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful 
30 Ferreira-Snyman (n.6).
31 Steven freeland, “In Heaven as on Earth? The International Law Regulation of the Military 
Use of Outer Space” (2011) 8 US-CHINA LAW REVIEW 272.
32 Freeland, Maogoto (n.23); Pavle Kilibarda “The Militarization of Outer Space and Liability 
Convention” (2015) 40 (3) 271.
33 UCS Satellite database available at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/sat-
ellite-database#.WX4KsoSGPIU (last checked 29 July 2017).
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interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,” then 
a State “may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.”
Leaving aside the fact that the Treaty neither proscribes the procedure for appro-
priate international consultations nor designates an agency with this function, a 
broad interpretation of Article IX could be very significant in the regulation of outer 
space activities.
“Harmful contamination of the outer space” and “harmful interference with 
outer space activities of other state-parties” are supposed to be avoided in pursuing 
studies and exploration of outer space. In fact, a persistent contamination of outer 
space would harm the whole community of spacefaring States if not the entire 
global community. One of the major sources of outer space contamination is space 
debris.
In effect, space debris is one of the most challenging issues for outer space activi-
ties: an unrestrained growth in the population of space debris could indeed lead to 
deny the future access to outer space to States that pursue this objective and even to 
States that currently exploit outer space.
There are currently 29,000 objects larger than 10 cm, 750,000 objects from 1 cm 
to 10 cm, and 166 million objects from 1 mm to 1 cm orbiting the Earth.34
Looking at the contemporary scenario, it can be sustained that the obligation of 
“no harmful contamination of outer space” and “no harmful interference with outer 
space activities of other state-parties” has progressively assumed, through the evo-
lution of space technology, a high value in the legal framework of the Outer Space 
Treaty.
With the state practice directed toward the threshold of weaponization and a 
growing population of space debris, Article IX should be considered the core of the 
future regulation of outer space activities.
In fact, it could be argued that the threat perceived by States does not come from 
the passive or active military use of outer space itself. Instead, the real threat per-
ceived by States seems to rest in the creation of space debris. Debris from an ASAT 
test or attack would generate thousands of these random fragments, dispersed into a 
lethal orbiting cloud and destined to remain aloft for years, decades, or even centu-
ries, especially in high-altitude orbits.35
With respect to Article IX, outer space activities shall firstly be in accordance 
with the obligations of “no harmful contamination of outer space” and of “no harm-
ful interference with outer space activities of other state-parties,” regarded as an 
inalienable condition of outer space exploitation itself. This circumstance shall have 
a particular significance with respect to the nature of military activities in outer 
space carried out by State parties, which should be aligned firstly with Article IX, 
seen as a fundamental threshold of lawfulness of each space activity.
This “case-by-case” approach does not exclude military uses of outer space or an 
evolution of the same if aligned with the obligation of Article IX.
34 ESA, “Space debris by the numbers” available at http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/
Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers
35 Koplow (n.12) at 1203.
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In fact, according to Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, space activities should 
be carried out in compliance with the international law and the United Nations 
Charter. Significantly, Article 51 of the UN charter is also applicable to the legal 
regulation of outer space, which confirms the “inherent right” of self-defense “if an 
armed attack occurs” even in outer space.36 States will not give up their right of self- 
defense in outer space, especially since space assets have become an essential infra-
structure. But this last assumption does not permit itself a “wild” militarization of 
outer space under the flag of the right of self-defense.
5.3  Final Remarks
The legal regime of Article IV has led to unconstrained military space operations 
increasingly oriented to the weaponization of outer space. This comes with the 
threat of an exponential growth of space debris, rendering outer space a potentially 
“toxic” environment.
The Outer Space Treaty shall be interpreted with a particular eye to the changing 
scenario which it refers. In this context, Article IX provides a precious legal frame-
work suitable to face the contemporary and future challenges which have been ana-
lyzed above so to adapt the principles and rules of the Treaty to evolving outer space 
activities. As was quoted above, the Outer Space Treaty is also an “initiation.”
International law shall respond proactively to the current issues, since with the 
increasing number of space actors and space-related interests, the thin factual and 
legal balance could break with unforeseen consequences.
36 Freeland (n.31) at 277.
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Chapter 6
Space Settlement and the Celestial Subjectivity 
Model: Shifting Our Legal Perspective 
of the Universe
Zach Miller
Abstract When considering the idea of human settlement of outer space, the dis-
cussion evolves from research stations and small outposts to large-scale habitats and 
complex societies. The current international legal regime does not account for the 
development of civilizations and sovereignty in outer space and on celestial bodies. 
The reason for this lies in the principle of conflict prevention that pervades the Outer 
Space Treaty. This principle, righteous as it may be, does not fit the modern world 
scene. In fact, the very definition of outer space is centered around the Earth, archai-
cally symbolizing a geocentric legal perspective of the universe. To allow for human 
settlement of outer space and celestial bodies, international law must address the 
concepts of civilizations and sovereignty. This can be done by redefining the human 
perspective of outer space according to the celestial subjectivity model, in which 
outer space becomes “the space outside of a celestial body’s gravity well relative to 
a state’s presence and perspective on that particular celestial body.” (Zach Miller, 
“On Celestial Subjectivity.” VAERO (2016). Available at https://www.vaerore-
search.com/single-post/2016/09/26/On-Celestial-Self-Determination.) The impli-
cations of altering the definition of outer space are both concrete and abstract, 
ranging from more clearly allowing national research stations to ensuring the right 
of self-determination within a future civilization of Mars colonists.
6.1  Introduction
In Sid Meier’s Civilization: Beyond Earth,1 various entities travel from Earth to 
colonize an exoplanet. The purpose of the game is to compete for resources and 
power in order to grow the player’s colony and defend it from other hostile colonies. 
1 Sid Meier’s Civilization: Beyond Earth. Firaxis Games, 2014. Video game.
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Real-world mechanisms such as diplomacy, scientific research, and economics are 
embodied in a simulated system. The game can be won by a handful of methods, 
such as by dominating the other colonies militarily or by reaching a heightened 
level of scientific research for technological superiority. As the various colonies 
grow in size and strength, resources become scarcer; additionally, different colonies 
adapt conflicting ideologies, increasing global tensions. No matter what strategy a 
player pursues, and no matter how peaceful a player attempts to be, eventually war 
is inevitable. Diplomacy is the only method for resolving a conflict or reducing the 
costs of war. Essentially every game in the Civilization series consists of these basic 
concepts adapted to a different historical time period with different actors, but 
Civilization: Beyond Earth2 is the only one projected into the future. This science- 
fiction simulation game inspires many questions for the future of space exploration, 
but the most important concept in the video game is the threat of war and conflict 
between space colonies. Even without losing wars, conflict in the game can prevent 
global progress toward scientific and cultural achievements. Fortunately, in the real 
world, laws exist to mitigate the threat of conflict in outer space, but how do these 
legal systems need to evolve in order to adapt to human settlement of outer space?
6.2  Concept of Human Settlement
Human settlement of outer space has yet to be seriously addressed in global discus-
sions about the future of space law. One reason for this is that human settlement 
seems like a mere possibility in the distant future; perhaps the issue is not ripe for 
consideration. This argument has some relevance, as human settlement certainly 
does not incite any sense of urgency within the minds of lawmakers. However, good 
laws adapt to change, and the drafters of good laws integrate some degree of fore-
sight in their decision-making. In considering changes to the space law regime, it 
would be wise to keep in mind the inevitable future of humanity’s expansion into 
space – not just to visit but to stay. The concept of human settlement does not entail 
short-duration scientific voyages to and from Earth, nor does it entail small research 
bases our tourism centers on celestial bodies. Human settlement is the growth of a 
civilization in outer space; it is the presence of a society that is advanced to such a 
degree as to have developed a culture and a way of life in a particular area.3 Human 
settlement is, put simply, people living life in outer space.
States are the primary actors in the use and exploration of outer space.4 In mod-
ern times, the private sector has drastically increased its role in space exploration; 
2 Id.
3 Andrew Targowski, “Towards a composite definition and classification of civilization.” 
Comparative Civilizations Review 60, no. 60 (2009): 6.
4 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 27 Jan. 1967, 610U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter “Outer 
Space Treaty”].
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nonetheless, the fact remains that persons, companies, and organizations are inher-
ently tied to the state. Regardless of whether or not the Outer Space Treaty was 
intended to account for private actors, states are still the building blocks of the 
international system, and historically, states tend to fight over resources and power. 
The Outer Space Treaty attempts to prevent conflict by disallowing national appro-
priation of outer space.5 Without delving into the influence of the Cold War on the 
Outer Space Treaty, the general philosophy was similar to the approach used in the 
Antarctic Treaty: removing the possibility of claiming resources effectively removes 
the incentive for states to engage in conflict with one another.6
The Outer Space Treaty is an exemplary work of international law, and it has 
been largely successful in keeping outer space from becoming a direct theater of 
war. This may be in large part due to the appropriations provision in Article 
II. However, declaring appropriation of outer space as off-limits has very nega-
tive consequences for outer space as a domain for human civilization, as land 
rights are critical to human settlement of outer space. Without the ability of 
states to establish sovereign claims on extraterrestrial land, colonies in space can 
never be fully established. There are some counterarguments revolving around 
treaty interpretation, such as the ambiguity involving the complexities of defin-
ing sovereignty or the possibility of colonies being international scientific out-
posts. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that when the topic of human settlement 
arises, this domain of the Outer Space Treaty is at the very least unclear or, at 
most, fundamentally flawed.
Solving this issue is not as simple as removing the prohibition of national 
appropriation. The drafters of the Outer Space Treaty were correct in their phi-
losophy that national competition yields national conflict. If national appropria-
tion of outer space is permitted, then the possibility of conflict increases, and the 
peaceful use of outer space becomes threatened. The philosophical argument 
behind Article II of the Outer Space Treaty  – and behind its predecessor, the 
Antarctic Treaty – is a good one that should be preserved as space law evolves and 
adapts to change. It seems that there is a contradiction at this intersection: human 
settlement of outer space is not possible without some degree of national appro-
priation, but prohibiting national appropriation is necessary for maintaining 
peaceful use of outer space. How, then, can the law provide for peace and human 
settlement simultaneously? The root cause of this problem is how outer space is 
interpreted from a legal standpoint; to solve it, there must be a change in human-
ity’s legal perspective of the universe.
5 Id., art. II.
6 The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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6.3  Legal Perspective of the Universe
6.3.1  Geocentric Model of Space Law
To understand this problem, it is necessary to consult the definitions of terms used 
in Article II. The language of the article reads as follows: “Outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”7 Outer space 
is defined in Merriam-Webster as the space immediately outside of the Earth’s 
atmosphere.8 The limit of outer space is perhaps customarily drawn at the Kármán 
line, 100 km above the Earth’s surface.9 A celestial body is vaguely defined as an 
aggregation of matter in the universe that constitutes a unit for astronomical study, 
such as planets or moons.10 The common meaning of appropriation entails setting 
something aside for exclusive use, but the inclusion of “by any other means” leaves 
the definition of appropriation so broad that virtually any form of ownership meets 
the definition. Synthesizing these definitions, Article II can be summarized as say-
ing that no nation may claim anybody of matter in the universe outside of the Earth’s 
atmosphere. Article II therefore effectively prohibits national claims in outer space.
In many legal discussions of Article II, lawyers focus primarily on interpreting 
the meaning of appropriation.11 However, “appropriation” is not the most essential 
term used in Article II; rather, the most fundamental piece of the Article’s language 
is the term “outer space” and the following specifications regarding celestial bodies. 
Consider the change in language: “The Moon and other celestial bodies are not 
subject to national appropriation.” Without using the term “outer space,” Article II 
prohibits national appropriation anywhere, even on Earth. The inclusion of “outer 
space” therefore serves as a specification that Earth is the only celestial body exempt 
from the appropriation provision in the Outer Space Treaty. Analyzing the implica-
tions of the definition of outer space leads to the realization that Article II, the Outer 
Space Treaty, and the entire legal perspective of the universe are completely geocen-
tric, with Earth as the center point of the legal universe.
Using the current definition of outer space, the planet Earth is not in outer space; 
Earth can be classified as “exospatial” or outside of outer space. Mars, being outside 
of the Earth’s atmosphere, is therefore in outer space, as are Titan, Ceres, and 
Kepler-186f. If a viewer is standing on the surface of Mars and staring up at the pale 
blue dot of Earth, then the viewer is looking at the only point in the entire universe 
7 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. II.
8 “Outer Space.” Merriam-Webster.com. Accessed 30 July 2017. Available at https://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/outerspace.
9 Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larson, Space Law: A Treatise (2013).
10 “Celestial Body.” Merriam-Webster.com. Accessed 30 July 2017. Available at https://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/celestialbody
11 Stephen Gorove, “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.” Fordham L. Rev. 37 (1968): 
349.
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that is not encompassed in the definition of outer space. In fact, even in the Martian 
gravity well, the viewer is standing in outer space. According to this perspective, if 
Mars is a celestial body, and if Mars is in outer space, then under Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty, there can be no claims of sovereignty on the Red Planet, thus 
hampering the possibility of human settlement on Mars. This same chain of logic 
applies to virtually any area in the entire domain of outer space, including on any 
celestial body or in the vacuum of empty space. This rationale especially compli-
cates national appropriation in other areas that are scarce or exclusive, such as 
Lagrangian points or geostationary orbits.12 A solution must be unearthed that not 
only changes how the Outer Space Treaty is interpreted but also provides a mecha-
nism that allows peaceful human settlement of outer space. This mechanism can be 
provided by redefining outer space.
6.3.2  Celestial Subjectivity Model of Space Law
Outer space can be redefined as “the space outside of a celestial body’s gravity well 
relative to a state’s presence and perspective on that particular celestial body.” This 
is the model of celestial subjectivity, a paradigm shift in humanity’s legal perspective 
of the universe. Under this definition of outer space, the essence of Article II changes 
to provide that no nation may claim anybody of matter in the universe outside of the 
gravity well of the celestial body on which that nation exists. This new rule accom-
plishes the same principle behind the original language used in Article II: preventing 
conflict between states by disallowing state competition for space resources. From 
the perspective of states on Earth, Mars is in outer space, but Earth is exospatial; to 
states on Earth, the universe is still geocentric. Earth states are free to compete for 
resources within the Earth’s gravity well, including orbital trajectories. But to a state 
on Mars, Earth is in outer space, and Mars is exospatial; the universe to a Martian 
state is Mars-centric. This method adapts to any celestial body: to a state on Kepler-
186f, Mars and Earth are both in outer space, but Kepler- 186f is exospatial.
Notably, this definition does not mean that only the space between celestial bod-
ies is outer space. This would mean that every celestial body is exospatial and there-
fore eligible for national appropriation. The celestial subjectivity model should be 
interpreted so that outer space is subjective: depending on the celestial location of a 
state, encompassing all celestial bodies outside of that state’s planetary gravity well. 
In this way, celestial bodies become nexus points for the expansion of human civi-
lization. One issue is that the definition of “celestial bodies” encompasses nearly 
every body of mass in the universe; under the new interpretation of Article II, aster-
oids and other space resources are likely off-limits for national appropriation. To 
avoid this, an exemption could be added to Article II that allows national appropria-
tion of celestial bodies with characteristics such as minimal gravity wells,  diminished 
capability to support human life, or great monetary value of the celestial body rela-
12 Declaration of the First Meeting of the Equatorial Countries (Bogotá Declaration), 3 Dec. 1976.
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tive to its settlement potential. This exemption would include most asteroids and 
comets, which would allow the space mining industry to flourish under a clearer 
framework of international obligations while also allowing human settlement of 
asteroids such as Ceres that do not fit into the exemption.
Moons are a very interesting category under the celestial subjectivity model. 
Though often  they have  relatively large gravity wells of their own, which would 
make them off-limits to national appropriation, moons are also within the overall 
gravity well of their parent planets, making them eligible for national appropriation. 
The exemption provided to certain asteroids does not fit well, as moons have estab-
lished orbits around parent planets and are continuously in permanent proximity to 
planetary bodies. The decision, then, comes down to a matter of policy, and the best 
policy may be to allow moons to be eligible for national appropriation. Take, for 
example, our Moon, which can be referred to as Luna for purposes of clarity. This 
would permit the possibility of national stations, outposts, and settlements while 
still allowing for private facilities. Infrastructure on Luna has enormous benefits for 
exploring the rest of the solar system, particularly with the dawn of in-space manu-
facturing and fuel production on the lunar surface. The benefits of constructing 
facilities on Luna, even if undertaken only by a select few countries, will reach other 
countries with developing space programs by allowing for greater access to space, 
including Earth orbit, cislunar stations, and access to other planetary bodies.
However, other planets in the solar system host moons with drastically different 
characteristics than Luna. Titan, a moon of Saturn, consists of liquid methane 
oceans and a thick, nitrogen-rich atmosphere. Titan is even a candidate for harbor-
ing life of some kind, and its characteristics also make it more eligible for eventual 
human settlement than Luna. For Titan, the idea of having a habitable parent planet 
with non-habitable moons is reversed; Titan is a habitat-eligible moon with a non- 
habitable parent planet. As such, the law should be flexible to fit both scenarios. The 
exemption applied to asteroids and comets could also be applied to moons, render-
ing Luna eligible for national appropriation and Titan ineligible. This exemption 
allows for national appropriation of more resource-oriented moons and disallows 
national appropriation of more settlement-oriented moons.
There is one apparent contradiction within the celestial subjectivity model of 
outer space. If the underlying principle is to allow national appropriation, but 
national appropriation beyond a state’s planetary gravity well is disallowed, then 
how can national appropriation occur? And if the premise is that national appropria-
tion is necessary for human settlement, then how can human settlement occur with-
out national appropriation? In terms of human settlement, how does the celestial 
subjectivity model actually change the effect of Article II? The celestial subjectivity 
model in Article II forbids a state from claiming sovereignty of another celestial 
body, just as does the original meaning of Article II. The United States cannot carve 
out a piece of territory, send hundreds of US citizens to a human settlement, and 
claim that the settlement is subject to the laws and authority of the United States. 
There is, however, a key difference that makes the celestial subjectivity model a 
much better definition of outer space for the purposes of human settlement.
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6.3.3  The Free Mars Approach: Sovereignty, Civilizations, 
and National Appropriation
The difference revolves around the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is much 
more complicated and ill-defined than jurisdiction. Whereas jurisdiction simply 
implies the control of a sovereign government, sovereignty requires the embodi-
ment of a people’s will to be self-governed; it involves the right of self- determination, 
infused into some authoritative structure. More fundamentally, sovereignty requires 
a group of people with shared cultural values and social structures: sovereignty 
requires a civilization.
With modern attention being devoted to the idea of settling the Red Planet, Mars 
is a fitting case study for this analysis. A small research outpost established on Mars 
by the United States is not a sovereign claim – it is a jurisdictional claim. In fact, 
such jurisdiction is already provided for by the current regime of international law. 
Inversely, a large-scale human settlement on Mars with its own governmental hier-
archy under the auspices of the United States is likely to be interpreted as a sover-
eign claim. This is what the current international legal regime does not provide for, 
and what the celestial subjectivity model would allow: the development of a civili-
zation on another celestial body. At some point, because humanity’s future in space 
is inevitable, a research outpost or small habitat will evolve into a civilization; at 
some point, a civilization will form, as opposed to an outpost of astronauts. The 
Outer Space Treaty must evolve to account for this. Under the celestial subjectivity 
model, the United States may establish a research station or scientific facility on 
Mars. But at some point, whenever a true civilization develops, whenever sover-
eignty is ripe for expression, the celestial subjectivity model prohibits the United 
States from retaining sovereign territory on Mars.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear line at when this point will occur, 
but the dawn of a true civilization will likely involve self-sustainability and sover-
eign political expressions from the Martian people. Whenever the Martian society 
has sufficiently developed into what can be called a civilization, the celestial subjec-
tivity model will prohibit the colonizing state from claiming sovereignty over the 
Martian civilization. A new state will be established on Mars, with sufficient gover-
nance to execute peaceful separation of the colony from the builder. In this way, the 
celestial subjectivity model allows for human settlement of another planet while 
prohibiting national colonization. Just by providing a new definition of outer space, 
the celestial subjectivity model allows for an entirely new method of colonization, 
oriented around habitable celestial bodies in which the presence of a civilization on 
a celestial body constitutes a sovereign entity, independent and free to act according 
to its own interests. This new form of colonization is focused on the expansion of 
life out into the solar system without sharply increasing the odds of conflict. To put 
this idea simply, once a civilization develops on a celestial body, a new sovereign 
state is created.
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There are four fundamental characteristics of a state: population, territory, gov-
ernment, and sovereignty.13 Any kind of Martian colony, including scientific out-
posts, will inevitably have the first three. The population consists of the astronauts 
or colonists, and with a larger population, the state of Mars becomes more tangible. 
Territory will exist in some form as well, whether as the buildings and infrastructure 
or as an area of land. The government will be present throughout the entire process, 
beginning with a professional hierarchy among Mars colonists and culminating in a 
governance model or regime. The last characteristic of a state that will arise on Mars 
is sovereignty, which emanates from the people.
There are various strategic benefits for having a sovereign Martian state.14 Under 
the old concept of colonization in which a colony perpetually remains under the 
control of the colonizing state, the odds of conflict are much greater than with the 
new colonial framework provided for by the celestial subjectivity model. Because 
the end result of a sovereign state on Mars will be made clear from the beginning of 
the colonization process, states will not be competing for sovereign territory or 
permanent control of resources. Instead, colonizing states will hope to interact with 
the Martian state for Martian resources. The economic incentive for building human 
settlements on Mars persists under the new colonial model; the resources are still 
present, and states will still be able to acquire those resources. Instead of physically 
fighting over who gets to control the resources, states will compete peacefully for 
deals with the Martian state. This is a two-pronged scenario in which humans can 
settle another celestial body and Earth can gain access to the celestial body’s 
resources. From a much more long-term perspective, having the plan for an inde-
pendent Mars prepared ahead of time prevents the risk of revolutionary conflict 
once societies on Mars become self-sustaining.
6.4  Conclusion
The future envisioned under the celestial subjectivity model may seem like a world 
out of science fiction, but the reality is that human expansion into the solar system is 
inevitable. Even the Outer Space Treaty recognizes this in its attempt to prevent con-
flict by restricting permanent expansion into space. Now, half a century later, the 
world scene has changed, and a new era of human exploration of outer space has 
dawned. Redefining how we perceive the universe from a legal perspective is essential 
to the idea of humanity as a multiplanetary species. The universe is not geocentric; 
likewise, our legal perspective of it should not be geocentric. Instead, building toward 
human settlement of the solar system and beyond, the legal perspective of outer space 
should be centered around a core aspect of humanity itself: the human civilization.
13 Andrew Coleman, “Determining the Legitimacy of Claims for Self-Determination: A Role for 
the International Court of Justice and the Use of Preconditions.” St Antony’s International Review 
6, no. 1 (2010): 57–78.
14 James Gilley, “The Case for Martian Independence.” The Strategy Bridge (2016). See also Sarah 
Bruhns and Jacob Haqq-Misra, “A Pragmatic Approach to Sovereignty on Mars.” Space Policy, 
vol. 38 (2016).
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Chapter 7
Outer Space Treaty During Fourth Industrial 
Revolution
Maria Baczyńska-Wilkowska
Abstract The Outer Space Treaty was created 50 years ago. It contains the general 
rules of the exploration of outer space by human beings. Since the Outer Space 
Treaty entered into force, an enormous technological progress has been done. 
This study discusses how the Outer Space Treaty influences the rights and respon-
sibilities of humans and robots in today’s laws and how it might provoke changes to 
the Outer Space Treaty.
7.1  Introduction
The Outer Space Treaty was opened for signature and entered into force in 1967. Its 
creation was affected by the first human spaceflight in 1961 done by Yuri Gagarin 
on board Vostok 1. The Treaty was developed several years after the Second World 
War, and the use of weapons, including nuclear weapons, was still fresh. Both 
events affected the Treaty where the respect for cosmonauts and a danger of weap-
ons were clearly visible.
During the last 50  years, social, economical, and technological conditions of 
mankind have dramatically changed. Nowadays we are at the beginning of the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0).1 It is the time where the barrier between 
human and machine disappears and the time where the internet of people, internet 
of things, internet of services, and internet of data communicate with each other. 
Cyber-physical systems control physical processes, create virtual copies of a real 
world, and undertake decentralized decisions.2 The process leads to growing 
popularity of autonomous robots, which are more and more powerful and present 
1 The term Industry 4.0 (originally Industrie 4.0) comes from a high-tech strategy project of the 
German government. It was presented for the first time in 2011 at the Hannover Fair.
2 Definition of the Fourth Industrial Revolution given in 2016 by Mario Hermann, Tobias Pentek, 
and Boris Otto in their paper “Design Principles for Industrie 4.0 Scenarios.”
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in the majority of areas of today’s life. Being popular on Earth, they will soon be 
popular in space.
The Outer Space Treaty was created when humans were the only known beings 
capable of making decisions in space, performing an exploration and use of space. 
Soon there will be, or perhaps already exist (dependent of the established defini-
tions), autonomous machines ready for exploration of celestial bodies. The current 
version of the Outer Space Treaty does not cover all cases of the exploration of outer 
space by A.I. other than humans.
7.2  Definitions
At the beginning of consideration about robot autonomy in outer space, it is crucial 
to define both “robot” and “autonomy.” These terms are not well defined in any law 
concept although some attempts to do so have already been made.3 From the techni-
cal point of view, robot is something between the simple machine and an artificial 
human being. It was designed for a purpose, is able to sense the environment, and 
moves itself or its parts.
Defining autonomous robots is much more difficult. It is said that an autonomous 
robot differs from a remotely controlled one in time that it can operate by itself. 
There is not such a case of fully remote-controlled machines and quite a long time 
in case of robots with high levels of autonomy. Autonomous robots could be addi-
tionally self-learning and adopt their behavior to the changes in the environment 
they are operating. They are at least periodically able to perform their tasks and 
make decisions without any control of any human operator.
As the autonomy of robots develops, robots are able to perform more difficult and 
responsible tasks and elongate the period during which they do not depend on human 
decisions. This is the reason why some rules of their behavior had to been defined.
7.3  Principles4 for Autonomy of Machines
There are a lot of people who proposed some kinds of rules that robots or their cre-
ators should follow. A majority of them were science fiction writers or fans, com-
puter scientists, or roboticians. They were the ones that realized that this issue 
started to be important. Lawyers became interested in this topic only a couple of 
years ago.
The first set of rules was given in 1942 by Isaac Asimov in his story “Runaround.” 
They become popular and known also for people who did not know his stories. They 
3 South Korea and the European Union have already started working to develop robot and AI law.
4 In fact the described principles are called laws. The author called them principles to avoid misun-
derstanding – they are not a part of any statutory law.
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have never become statutory law, but they are a set of universal principles that a lot 
of people follow in their understanding of robotic law. The Three Laws are5:
 1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being 
to come to harm.
 2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings except where such 
orders would conflict with the First Law.
 3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not con-
flict with the First and Second Law.
These were accompanied later with the zeroth law6:
 0. A robot may not injure humanity or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to 
harm.
The last (or the first in the sense of their order) law might be especially valuable 
for robots operating in outer space as it leaves an open door for situations when any 
other life form would be found at any celestial body.
The Three Laws were the only robotic laws for a long time, but in the 1990s 
Mark W. Tilden set up a new set of rules for robots based on the Darwinian model. 
He pointed out that robots are similar to biological creatures, and thus the most 
important for them should be to protect themselves, to feed themselves, and to find 
their property. It leads to a set of rules that express nature rules in electronic 
environment7:
 1. A robot must protect its existence at all costs.
 2. A robot must obtain and maintain access to its own power source.
 3. A robot must continually search for better power sources.
These two concepts are strictly opposite: from the robot as a slave of a human 
being we went to a robot that is a separate independent being. The first idea concen-
trates on human security which is in line with current ethics. Human life has the 
highest value and thus should be protected no matter what the circumstances are. 
The second idea does not take any human being into consideration. According to 
Tilden’s laws, robots are another group of creatures beside humans, animals, and 
plants, so they should behave like humans, animals, and plants. They should make 
use of the available resources taking into account only their own security.
There is also a third important set of principles for robotic designers, builders, 
and users. They were developed by researchers with different backgrounds: engi-
neers, physicists, sociologists, and ethicists from both the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
5 Isaac Asimov, “I, Robot,” 1950.
6 Introduced by Isaac Asimov in his novel Robots and Empire. Usually called the zeroth law as is 
should precede Three Laws because it is the most important and the most general one. Sometimes 
called Fourth Law as it was created after Three Laws.
7 Presented in 1994 during Fred Hapgood interview with Mark W. Tilden for Wired magazine. 
https://www.wired.com/1994/09/tilden/?pg=1&topic=
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(AHRC) of Great Britain. They pay attention to the purpose for which the robots are 
designed and the ethics robots should follow. The EPSRC/AHRC principles are8:
 1. Robots should not be designed solely or primarily to kill or harm humans.
 2. Humans, not robots, are responsible agents. Robots are tools designed to achieve 
human goals.
 3. Robots should be designed in ways that assure their safety and security.
 4. Robots are artifacts; they should not be designed to exploit vulnerable users by 
evoking an emotional response or dependency. It should always be possible to 
tell a robot from a human.
 5. It should always be possible to find out who is legally responsible for a robot.
The above concept lays somewhere in between Asimov’s and Tilden’s laws. 
Human life and security are the most important, but robot safety and security should 
also been taken into consideration. The influence of Asimov’s hierarchy between 
humans and robot is significant, but there are not only the rights of humans that are 
assigned. Also the responsibilities are strictly defined. Humans are liable for robot 
behavior and their consequences. Humans are the ones that should ensure robots 
with a safe environment and protect them. The relations between humans and robots 
are similar to minors and their parents or guardians in statutory law.
7.4  Liability
All the above laws are rather general principles to follow to put the autonomy con-
cept in the right direction. They are not officially created or at least accepted by any 
legislators. However they describe to some extent the rights and obligations of 
robots and their creators. They could have an impact on the statutory law, especially 
in the case of EPSRC/AHRC principles, which touch the issues of social law.
South Korea was the first state that tried to develop a set of statutory laws on 
robots and their existence. They were meant to be preceded by the South Korean 
Robot Ethics Charter.
The European Union also sees the need for a legislative motion for robots. The 
Policy Department of the European Parliament drafted the key issues9 that should 
be covered. A majority of them will be important also in outer space. The first and 
the most important issue is to create an international register of robots and make a 
possibility to identify any single robot and to put its data into the register. It would 
allow to clearly identify the owner10 of the robot who is responsible for it. All 
8 The laws were published in 2011 by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) and the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) of Great Britain.
9 Nathalie Nevejans, “European Civil Law Rules in Robotics,” Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2016.
10 Only if a relation of the ownership will remain between people and robots. It might be converted 
into tutor, creator, or even an employer if robots obtain any kind of legal personality.
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producers should be forced to develop a built-in kill switch that allows to turn off a 
robot in case of its improper behavior and leaves a possibility to update its software 
if necessary. In other words, the idea is to identify a person or an organization 
responsible for any robot either as an owner, a producer, or a user and to attach to 
them the appropriate level of liability. The robots’ liability is then in fact the liability 
for the robots, and it should work both on Earth and in outer space.
The situation was further complicated this year when the first robot was given a 
citizenship. It happed in Hasselt, Belgium. Fran Pepper was given Belgian citizen-
ship, and thus she is also a citizen of the EU. Her parents are Astrid Hannes and 
Francis Vos. The question arises if they are liable for Fran. Or maybe she is liable 
for herself? Can a human be liable for a robot who has a citizenship?11
There is a concept to give robots a digital personality which makes them liable 
for themselves. They would then be able to be accused and be sentenced. It is pre-
dicted to be working for robots with a high level of autonomy. But then the high 
level of autonomy should be defined. Suppose we have a robot with great autonomy 
and thus with a digital personality. Is the robot liable for himself just from the begin-
ning of its existence? Is he first in his childhood (training period)? Where is the 
border between being a child robot and an adult robot?
Nowadays humans are robots’ producers. Thus the issue of being responsible for 
a robot touches only human. In the near future, it might be possible that a robot will 
develop another robot. The question arises about the human owner or producer of a 
robot. Will it be an owner/producer of an original robot (inheritance concept)12 or an 
owner of a place or resources where the creations were done (nationality concept).13
7.5  Space Law vs. Robotic Law
The concept of robotic and AI law is quite new, and thus it is not present yet in the 
law concepts of every nation. Some nations consider giving “personhood” status to 
robots, while others are not taking any considerations on the matter. It might lead to 
unequal treatment of robots and their liability if the “electronic personality” of 
robots will not be a common concept defined by the worldwide space law. There is 
a lot to do in that matter, but it is crucial to develop an ontology that contains words 
common for robotics and the space sector.
The size of outer space is enormous, completely incomparable with the number 
of robots that has been there. One may say that it is rarely probable that a robot will 
meet another robot or human in space, and thus it is even less probable that a robot 
could create harm to somebody or something. But the law should be prepared for 
11 http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Robot-zostal-obywatelem-Belgii-Dostal-oficjalny-akt-
urodzenia-7497128.html
12 The owner of a robot is also an owner of all robots produced by his robot.
13 The owner of any resources (parts, production lines) that were used to produce robots becomes 
an owner of a created robot.
7 Outer Space Treaty During Fourth Industrial Revolution
annette.froehlich@espi.or.at
72
that. The liability issues have to be defined. They are quite well defined in Article VI 
of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) that says: “States Parties of the Treaty shall bear 
international responsibility for national activities in the outer space.”14 A more 
detailed liability can be defined at the national level of every state that signed the 
Outer Space Treaty. The correlation between international law and national law is 
well stated. This is the nationality that should be specified for every robot. It could 
be secured by a new article saying that each robot launched into outer space or pro-
duced there has to be clearly identified with a particular state party.
7.6  Conclusions
The Outer Space Treaty should be redirected by adding appropriate sections of 
robotic law. As it will be a treaty for different nations with different levels of their 
digital development, it should have simple rules to follow by robots on different 
levels of complexity. There is a lot to do, and the recommendations are given below 
in a form of an algorithm:
 1. Define “robot” and “autonomy.”
 2. Differentiate between a robot as a thing (object or machine) and a robot as a 
being with legal personality.
 (a) If a robot is an object, check if the current rules of the OST hold (especially 
Articles VII and VIII).
 (b) If a robot is a legal person, create set of rules that this being could follow 
(rewrite especially Article V).
 3. Go through the OST, and check what actions (i.e., exploration) are predicted to 
be for humans or could be done by robots. Add robots in appropriate articles.
 4. Revise Article XII on the property of one nation available for others in terms of 
robots as both users of the property and an element of the property.
 5. Check if the treaty is in line with the current state-of-the-art robotic ethics.
The attention should be paid on the speed in which the robotics changes. The 
Outer Space Treaty has remained unchanged for 50 years. It might happen that after 
some changes, it will need some updates in a couple of years. It is sure that changes 
in robotics will be done and that they will be done very fast, but there is nothing sure 
about the conditions for beings after the changes. Thus it is not possible to predict 
what rules the Outer Space Treaty will be needed in the next 50 years. Any changes 
should express changes that are now or will be in a few years. Nowadays humans try 
to put robots into humans’ law, give them humans’ work and responsibilities, and 
assure themselves from any harm that could be done to them by robots. It is possible 
14 Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty defines liability for exploration of space. Every space party 
is responsible for any action undertaken by its citizens or companies in space.
M. Baczyńska-Wilkowska
annette.froehlich@espi.or.at
73
that robots will not be interested in cooperation with humans at all15 and they will 
create their own laws.
Thinking about physical robots, it is also worthwhile to consider an autonomous 
agent which16 is not a robot according to the definition mentioned in this article. In 
might happen that, as our reality becomes more virtual, an autonomous piece of 
software will take over the goals of a physical robot. It will be able to make an effect 
on humans similar to the one that the robots would make or even greater. It will have 
great possibilities and responsibilities but it will not move physically any of its 
parts.
The Outer Space Treaty after 50 years is still a perfect background stating rules 
for exploration of outer space. However, some new laws should be added to specify 
the use of robotics and artificial autonomous beings.
15 Eliezer S. Yudkowsky, Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk, 
2007, http://yudkowsky.net (Access in July 2017).
16 Maybe there should be who instead of which if robots obtain digital personality as proposed in 
the merit to European Commission.
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Chapter 8
Into the Twenty-First Century:  
Integration of Principles of Global 
Governance in Space Law
Valentin Degrange
Abstract This analysis aims at proposing a fresh legal view of the Outer Space 
Treaty (OST) that would conciliate the presence of both nations and private entities 
in the industry. The latter, who has been revealed to be a major player of the space 
industry in the last two decades, is today slowed down by the absence of clear inter-
national legislation in several domains pertaining to the exploitation of outer space. 
In order to allow for the growth of the space sector, it then seems essential for the 
international community to act accordingly. On the 50th anniversary of the Outer 
Space Treaty, it is fitting to envisage a substitute that would need to take into account 
the commercial aspirations of states but also protect the ability of firms to generate 
profit in order to foster investments. This could be accomplished by integrating prin-
ciples of global governance to international space law in order to dynamize the sec-
tor, all the while setting up a regime that affirms the status of states as patrons of the 
protection of the general principles of the original OST. This way a balance could be 
found between the ambitions of the private sector and the sovereignty of nations.
8.1  Introduction
While we are already well into the twenty-first century, it appears clearer now that 
new actors are progressively becoming the leaders of the space industry to the detri-
ment of states. Nations have been the primary subjects of international space law 
ever since the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and are still for a large part responsible 
for the production of norms pertaining to space activities, but the private sector is 
becoming increasingly important to the survival and development of the industry. 
Private actors are indeed not only a major source of financing but also the instigators 
of space projects on a grand scale, and their expansion in the space sector is steadily 
ousting nations as the number one space actors.
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This tendency is not a particularity of the space industry but only a mere facet of 
a global phenomenon of denationalization of international law.1 It seems it should be 
time for the international community to react accordingly and to adapt space law to 
the challenges it faces today. The main issue is that while the OST implemented a 
number of general principles with the intent of regulating a space race between 
opposing superpowers, it left out many important details on the account of there not 
being sufficient technology to fully exploit outer space at the time. As a result, vague 
definitions and divergence of interpretations2 have led most private actors to hold 
back on their projects, fearful that there would be unforeseen consequences to their 
space activities. These divergences, ranging from the definitions of “space object” or 
“mankind” to the many interpretations of the non-appropriation principle or the 
delimitation of outer space, have made investors wary of the potential fallout of their 
businesses. For example, the actual effervescence about the exploitation of natural 
resources of outer space, and the relative failure of the Moon Agreement of 1979, 
have proven the necessity to calm the fears of the private sector concerning the 
“equitable sharing by all State parties in the benefits derived from those resources.”3
This has unfortunately slowed down the development of space activities since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century and condemned private entities to a standstill 
while nations are still arguing over the interpretations of the articles of a treaty con-
cluded 50 years ago. A possible solution to this legal deadlock between states would 
be to try and conciliate the presence of both nations and private actors in the indus-
try. This would mean taking into account the commercial aspirations of states on the 
one hand and protecting the ability of firms to generate profit in order to foster 
investments on the other hand. Such a goal could be accomplished by  integrating 
principles of global governance4 to international space law and allowing bottom-up 
1 Christian Chavagneux, “La montée en puissance des acteurs non étatiques,” in Jacquet Pierre, 
Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), Gouvernance mondiale (Rapport du conseil d’Analyse 
économique n°37, La documentation française, 2010) 233; Lider Bal, Le mythe de la souveraineté 
en Droit international, La souveraineté des États à l’épreuve des mutations de l’ordre juridique 
international (Thesis, Centre d’études internationales et européennes, Université de Strasbourg, 
2012).
2 Brendan Cohen and Elena Carpanelli, “Interpreting ‘Damage Caused by Space Objects’ under the 
Liability Convention” (2013), 56, 56th IISL Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Proceedings 
of the International Institute of Space Law; E. Fasan, “The meaning of the term mankind in space 
legal language” (1974), Journal of Space Law, 125; Fabio Tronchetti, “The non-appropriation prin-
ciple under attack: using article II of the Outer Space Treaty in its defense” (2007), 50, 50th IISL 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law; 
Frans Von Der DUNK, “Liability vs. Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception or 
Misconstruction” (1991), Space and Telecommunication Law Program Faculty Publications; 
Olavo de O. Bittencourt NETO, “The elusive frontier: revisiting the delimitation of Outer Space” 
(2012), 55, 55th IISL Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Proceedings of the International 
Institute of Space Law; S. Gorove, “Interpreting article II of the outer space treaty” (1969), Fordham 
Law Review, 351; S. M. Williams, “The principle of non-appropriation” (1970), 13, IISL, 157.
3 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 
December 1979 (entered into force 11 July 1984), art. 11§7d.
4 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), Gouvernance mondiale (Rapport du 
conseil d’Analyse économique n°37, La documentation française, 507 p., 2010).
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international lawmaking5 to become an effective way of producing space law, all the 
while setting up a regime designed to temper the influence of private actors in order 
to keep the general principles of the original OST from being violated.
8.2  Governance in Outer Space: An Instrument 
of Development
In order to make international space law a more comprehensive set of rules, law-
makers would have to take into account the needs of the industry and its actors in a 
dynamic sector and not only national interests of states that invariably end up slow-
ing down or even blocking its development. To do so, this analysis proposes to 
integrate principles of governance to space law as well as to establish an institu-
tional framework adapted to the specificities of space activities.
Governance is a controversial notion because it is defined in a variety of ways, 
sometimes contradictory, but also used in a variety of fields (public, private, envi-
ronmental, corporate, global, etc.). For the purpose of this discussion, it will be 
defined as the establishment of policies, and continuous monitoring of their proper 
implementation, by the members of the governing body of an organization. It 
includes the mechanisms required to balance the powers of these members, with the 
associated accountability, and to enhance the prosperity and viability of the organi-
zation through efficiency. According to Stoker,6 governance implies five essential 
elements: the intervention of many actors, which do not all belong to the govern-
mental sphere; an erasure of frontiers between public and private sectors; an inter-
dependency between the institutions associated with collective action; there are 
networks of autonomous actors; and finally, a possibility of acting without relying 
on state power or authority. In the present case, we will focus on global governance, 
which can be defined as “the complex of formal and informal institutions, mecha-
nisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and 
organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective interests 
on the global plane are articulated, right and obligations are established, and differ-
ences are mediated.”7 Rosenau has used the term “global governance” to denote the 
regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of an overarching political 
authority.8
5 Janet K. Levit, “Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of 
International Law” (2007), 32, Yale J. Int’l L.
6 Gerry Stoker, “Cinq propositions pour une théorie de la gouvernance” (1998), revue internatio-
nale des sciences sociales, 20.
7 Ramesh Thakur; Luk Van Langenhove. “Enhancing Global Governance through Regional 
Integration” (2006), 12, Global Governance, 233.
8 James N. Rosenau, “Toward an Ontology for Global Governance,” in Martin Hewson and Thomas 
Sinclair, eds., Approaches to Global Governance Theory (SUNY Press, Albany, 1999).
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In the field of space activities, that last statement is particularly accurate consid-
ering that space law is a part of international law in which the primary subjects are 
states. In regard to the principle of sovereignty, proclaimed in the UN Charter,9 and 
to Article I of the OST10 which states that the freedom of exploration and uses of 
outer space only benefit nations, the absence of an overarching political authority 
competent with all space-related matters is especially noteworthy. International 
space law, up until now, has been laboriously produced through lengthy negotia-
tions between sovereign states defending national interests. Thus, it only encom-
passes general principles and grand declarations of intention which, while setting 
up major tenets of this particular field of activity, only grazed the surface and never 
offered an in-depth international regime addressing the specifics of space activities. 
Even worse, the lack of a centralized means of law-making or even of a way of 
coordinating national legal efforts to regulate all aspects of space activities, or at 
least of harmonizing existing laws, seems to have provoked a sort of regulatory 
competition between states.11 In order to attract investments and to encourage pri-
vate firms to base themselves within their borders, nations now adapt their legisla-
tion regarding, for example, the authorization of space activities as well as liability 
and insurance requirements. The additional observation made concerning the 
increasing implication of private entities, and the subsequent multiplication of 
actors involved in space activities, proves the necessity of the establishment of an 
effective way of regulation.
8.2.1  Classical Models of Global Governance
Concerning the models that could be used to set up an institutionalized space gov-
ernance, there are several possibilities that need to be addressed here, possibilities 
that can be sorted out in two different kinds of models: classical models and emerg-
ing models. These models are directly inspired from those of global governance,12 
considering the nature of space activities. In order to offer an exhaustive analysis of 
these institutional shapes, it is imperative to start with the two classical forms of 
global governance even though they don’t offer an operational model in today’s 
economy. The first of these two classical models is that of the world government13 
which is basically the transposition on a global scale of a federal government. It 
9 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945 (entered into force 24 October 1945), art. 2§1.
10 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967 (entered into force on 10 
October 1967), art. I.
11 Dimitri Linden, “The impact of national space legislation on private space undertakings: a regu-
latory competition between States?” (2015), vol. 58, 58th IISL Colloquium on the Law of Outer 
Space, Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law.
12 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 66.
13 Idem.
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would then use a single unified set of rules under the supervision of a global parlia-
ment. There are many advantages such a model could procure to the world and to 
the space industry in particular – a unique set of rules for all private actors of the 
world, space programs run by the global government, etc. – and it has sparked many 
brilliant ideas from researchers all over the world (e.g., the Tobin Tax,14 the cosmo-
politan democracy of Held,15 or the global federalism of Dani Rodrik16). It is how-
ever very unlikely that we will ever see that kind of model in action. The mere 
example of the European Union shows the difficulty to unify different countries 
under one federal government. Furthermore, it seems unnecessary to go to such 
length only to make the space industry more efficient.
The second classical model of governance that needs to be presented here is that 
of institutionalized cooperation of nations.17 Contrary to the world government 
which is largely of a hypothetical nature, this one is on the contrary quite operational 
as it is the one that has been used ever since the end of the Second World War. 
According to this neorealistic approach, states are the sole source of legitimacy and 
organize themselves to cooperate according to their needs. This cooperation can be 
somewhat limited (e.g., League of Nations) or more demanding (e.g., United 
Nations) but is of an intergovernmental nature in any case. In effect, it is more or less 
the model that has been used in space-related matters since the first Space Race. 
Nations are asked to cooperate, either through the system of the UN or all five space 
treaties, but the level of cooperation between states is still relatively low. Space pow-
ers generally prefer to conduct their own activities and confine situations of coopera-
tion to specific operations, as it is the case with the International Space Station, for 
example.18 While it seemed like the best model to use for a long time, the institution-
alized cooperation of nations does have limits that prevent it from being an effective 
way to govern space activities in today’s world. The strength of this model lies in the 
fact that it should combine the effectiveness of proven solutions with the legitimacy 
enjoyed by democratic governments. However, it is unsatisfactory on both accounts 
because when national interests differ, intergovernmentalism transforms every issue 
into a bargaining object, resulting in the formation of coalitions and the elaboration 
of compromises whose efficiency is questionable at best. In conclusion, this model 
of governance, while respecting principles of sovereignty and making nations the 
sole originators of laws, also slows down the development of the space industry in 
14 James Tobin, “A Proposal for International Monetary Reform” (1978), Eastern Economic 
Journal, 153.
15 Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy. An Agenda for a New 
World Order (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995); David Held, Democracy and the Global Order 
(Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995).
16 Dani Rodrik, “How far will international economic integration go?” (2000), vol. 14 n°1, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 177–186.
17 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 68.
18 International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, 29 January 1998 (entered into force 
27 March 2001).
8 Into the Twenty-First Century: Integration of Principles of Global Governance…
annette.froehlich@espi.or.at
80
that every step forward becomes incredibly difficult especially since it is already 
worth over US$330 billion19 and generates hundreds of thousands of jobs.
The classical models of global governance seem to be rather ineffective at being 
applied to space activities and already don’t correspond to the reality of contempo-
rary economy, but it is however conceivable that the emerging models of gover-
nance that recently sprung up in international law could. The classical models are 
based on the assumption that legitimacy is derived from elections, while in fact most 
specialized institutions (both national and international) do not humor democratic 
requirements. Experts are appointed, not elected, in order to bring a certain compe-
tence to the table and to make decisions based on efficiency. The models of gover-
nance that have been emerging in the international society for the past few years 
clearly stand on that side of the line and will be presented here as potential solutions 
for a governance of space activities.
8.2.2  Emerging Models of Global Governance
The first of these models is that of the network of independent authorities,20 which 
is the most representative of these emerging models. The literal or figurative “share-
holders” of these authorities are the states. Therefore, their legitimacy is ultimately 
based on the democratic process that has established their missions and the method 
of appointing their officials and specified their obligations of transparency and the 
conditions under which they are to report on the execution of their mandate, but 
their distance from politics is an asset rather than a handicap. Tirole21 reckons that 
delegation to an independent body is preferable to political responsibility, for exam-
ple, when decisions are too technical for voters to exercise direct control over the 
elected officials, when consequences are only known with great delay, or when the 
preferences of the majority can be severely harmful to a minority. This model has a 
certain relevance in terms of global governance and even more so concerning space 
activities where institutions of experts could be given authority to legislate on space 
matters.
The second model that is used in international law and which could be used to set 
up a space governance is the model of Law without the States.22 It is based on the 
action of supranational judicial bodies, and its central argument is that on the basis 
of a legal corpus (which can be very limited), the dynamics of jurisprudence are 
19 As shown in the 2015 Space Report of the Space Foundation, URL: https://www.spacefounda-
tion.org/sites/default/files/downloads/The_Space_Report_2015_Overview_TOC_Exhibits.pdf
20 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 70.
21 Jean Tirole, “La gouvernance des institutions internationales,” in Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry 
Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), Gouvernance mondiale (Rapport du conseil d’Analyse économique 
n°37, La documentation française, 2010) 291.
22 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 71.
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likely to produce an efficient legal system.23 This model builds on both the move-
ment of private international law production at the initiative of enterprises and the 
intensification of production of public international law following the establishment 
of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The 
first movement, through the combination of private and public initiatives, led to the 
emergence of a “law of globalization” with an economic vocation. The second is 
sufficiently striking for having given rise to the disputes that we know. In both cases 
it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that new sources of law have emerged, 
beyond the usual procedure of international negotiation between governments. In 
the specific context of space law, it can be noted that no international jurisdiction 
except the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is competent to sit in judgment for 
space-related litigation. The creation of a specialized supranational judicial body, 
however, could be a sufficiently flexible method of creating standards to accommo-
date the evolutions of space technologies and activities. It might not only be the 
occasion to put specialized judges up to the task but also to allow non-state parties, 
such as private firms, to make their cases before the court. In any case, the creation 
of such a judicial body might become necessary considering that with the increase 
in space activities, the number of disputes will almost certainly escalate as well and 
the ICJ is not equipped to deal with a potentially huge number of cases.
Finally, the last emerging model of global governance that could be used to foster 
the development of the space industry is that of private autoregulation.24 It would 
indeed be foolish to limit the scope of alternatives to public regulations. In their 
absence, private regulations soon take root, occupy space, create norms, and estab-
lish jurisprudence. This is eloquently illustrated by the case of the Internet, where, 
despite its weaknesses (weak legitimacy, uncertain authority, institutional complex-
ity, jurisdictional conflicts, legal uncertainty, lack of sanctioning power), the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and other private regula-
tors have, thanks to their speed and flexibility, decisive advantages over public regu-
lation and essentially determine the rules of the game. Furthermore, the modalities 
of private regulation can be sources of inspiration for public regulation. To over-
come the shortcomings of traditional public regulation, Rischard has recently pro-
posed the creation of Global Issues Networks,25 which involve governments, civil 
society, companies, and international organizations, on a number of international 
issues. The objective would be to produce recommendations or noncoercive codes 
of conduct. Rather than waiting for the implementation of general obligations and 
associated compliance mechanisms, Rischard proposes to rely on soft law tools and 
on reputation effects to ensure their effectiveness. Regarding the space industry, this 
model could present the undeniable advantage of putting the responsibility of regu-
lating space activities in the hands of those directly involved: professionals and 
23 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, “Le droit, source et forme de régulation mondiale,” in Jacquet Pierre, 
Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), Gouvernance mondiale (Rapport du conseil d’Analyse 
économique n°37, La documentation française, 2010) 313.
24 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 72.
25 Jean-François Rischard, High Noon: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them (Basic Books, 
256 p., 2003).
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industrials. This form of bottom-up lawmaking26 would not only allow for the 
growth of the space sector but would also be able to cope with its rapid evolution, 
contrary to public instances.
In conclusion, it seems that there are a number of options at the disposal of the 
international society in order to not only regulate space activities more efficiently 
but also to enable the law to keep up with their constant development. Any of these 
models could be implemented by a treaty and then used to apply principles of good 
governance to the space sector. However, it should be kept in mind that the OST has 
proclaimed general principles of great moral value and that those principles should 
be protected by a regime that takes into account not only the needs of the industry 
but those of all nations as well. Thus, it would seem imperative for the international 
community to take both into account if it were to ever amend the Outer Space Treaty 
or to conclude a new one.
8.3  The Necessity to Mitigate the Influence of the Private 
Sector
Indeed, though it may seem desirable to include private actors in the lawmaking 
process (either through specialized institutions, judicial precedent, or private regu-
lation) in order to make the industry more competitive and foster its development, 
precautions must however be taken in order to avoid a tyranny of the market. 
Unbridled private space activities could go against all the principles that were pro-
claimed in the OST to protect outer space as a res communis as well as the rights of 
all nations of the world. The idea is then for the international community to build a 
regime that stimulate the growth of the space industry by making laws that fill in the 
blanks left by the OST and by offering satisfying interpretations of obscure points 
of regulations, all the while conciliating with the intention of the general principles 
proclaimed by the treaty.
The most relevant example would be that of the non-appropriation principle,27 
especially considering the interest recently expressed by numerous private firms to 
exploit the natural resources of outer space.28 If the 1967 Treaty prohibits the national 
appropriation of outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies, it does not explic-
itly forbid other forms of appropriation. Over the years, several interpretations of 
Article II of the OST have been made. Some people think that individual ownership 
by a private company or an international organization is therefore possible, since it 
26 Janet K. Levit (n 6).
27 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967 (entered into force 10 
October 1967), art. II.
28 Several examples can be given here, such as Planetary Resources (URL: www.planetaryre-
sources.com) or Deep Space Industries (URL: http://deepspaceindustries.com/).
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is only a question of national appropriation.29 Others believe, on the contrary, that the 
principle of non-appropriation is absolute and prohibits not only the creation of pub-
lic rights but also private rights, first because Articles VI and VII cover both govern-
mental and nongovernmental activities and second because the preparatory work of 
the 1967 Treaty shows that the drafters’ will was “to totally prohibit national 
appropriation.”30 Finally, a third, more nuanced interpretation indicates that there is 
a flagrant but not intractable contradiction between the idea of freedom of use and 
that of non-appropriation. The installation of bases, factories, airstrip laboratories, 
etc. on a celestial body will create de facto exclusive rights of use on the correspond-
ing plots of land. The possibility for entities to lease or sell the facilities that it has 
built will give rise to the legal title “real estate” and not “land” and therefore respect-
ing the principle of non-appropriation. We can therefore envisage private rights relat-
ing to the use of body and of this space.31 The fact is that the lack of action from the 
international community concerning the interpretation of Article I has led private 
actors to hold back any project of exploitation of natural resources, which only 
changed recently with the recent adoption of the “Space Act” in the USA.32
8.3.1  Globalist Interpretation
Article I of the OST33 claims that space activities “shall be carried out for the benefit 
and in the interests of all countries,” which raises the question of whether profits 
derived from commercial use of space by a private enterprise should be shared 
among all members of the international community. There are two answers to that 
question. First, the globalist interpretation tends to say that the commercial use of 
space must ensure a profit for all mankind. This does not necessarily mean the activ-
ity itself but essentially the end result of the enterprise. Marcoff argues “… the final 
results of any excavation, transformation, or trade, of the non-renewable natural 
resources of the celestial bodies, must be ‘de lege lata’ for the benefit of all States, 
irrespective of their stage of development.”34 We can assume that the same could be 
said about any form of commercial space activity. The main argument here is that 
redistribution of profits is perfectly consistent with and follows logically Article I of 
the 1967 Treaty. Nothing, therefore, prohibits the lucrative private commercial 
activity as long as the benefits derived therefrom are universalized either by being 
redistributed or by serving the common interest of all countries. For this reason, this 
29 S. Gorove (n 3), 351.
30 S. M. Williams (n 3), 157.
31 Mireille Couston, Droit Spatial (Ellipses edition, Paris, 2014), 71.
32 H.R.2262 – 114th Congress (2015–2016): US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act.
33 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967 (entered into force 10 
October 1967), art. I.
34 M.G. Marcoff, Traité de DIPE (Fribourg, 1973, 678).
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interpretation is the most popular among developing countries. This theory, how-
ever, is questionable for several reasons. First of all, it can be considered “unnatu-
ral” in regard to commercial motivation. Second, it is contrary to the general 
principle of equity of international law, since only a few countries would then con-
tribute to the development of space activities, while the benefits are redistributed to 
all. And finally, the question of losses is totally ignored, to speak only of the bene-
fits, whereas it would be logical in a scheme of universal collectivization to share 
the two. One could, however, imagine an equitable and proportional distribution of 
the efforts made for the development of these activities in order to reconcile prin-
ciples of common interest and private interest.
8.3.2  Restrictive Interpretation
The second interpretation is the restrictive interpretation, according to which Article 
I of the 1967 Treaty is interpreted as a mere declaration of principle expressing a 
wish.35 This principle would therefore not be self-executing. Only outer space and 
celestial bodies, or scientific information derived from their exploration, should be 
used for the benefit of all, the economic results of their use normally belonging to 
the state/group of states/private firm that acquires them. That is the most reasonable 
interpretation, if only because it preserves the interest of the private sector, driven 
by the search for profit, to actually invest in the space industry. More subtle solu-
tions must then be found to promote the equal exploitation of space, depending on 
the situation and the type of exploitation envisaged: institutionalized sharing of 
technologies, establishment of concessions for mining activities, etc. At first glance, 
the idea of making private companies an official actor in space activities and espe-
cially in normative production, through the implementation of an adapted model of 
governance, does not necessarily give advantages to a particular state or group of 
states. Yet, the fact is that the majority of these firms are of the nationality of the 
main space powers, and this would inevitably affect the market and the place of 
developing countries in space activities. However, it can be imagined that this situ-
ation could be tempered by market forces, as it has been the case with the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the practice of “paper 
satellites.”36 The idea of an international regime akin to the OST of 1967 but that 
would include principles of governance to stimulate space activities is promising, as 
long as the ambitions of private actors are tempered with skill. This begs the ques-
tion of the finality of governance.
35 S. Gorove, “Interpretations of international space law for private enterprise” (1982), ADAS, 319.
36 which constitute a form of speculation on spectral resources, since they are not associated with 
real projects but correspond to the acquisition of frequencies for their market value. See Laurence 
Ravillon, Droit des activités spatiales – Adaptation aux phénomènes de commercialisation et de 
privatisation (Travaux du Credimi, vol. 22, Paris, Litec, 2004), 223.
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If the international community ever decides to integrate principles of global gov-
ernance to the space industry, the former should first of all decide toward which goal 
the latter must tend. To that regard, two conceptions of global governance coexist. 
For the first of these conceptions,37 it must essentially be based on stable rules of the 
game, the function of which is to coordinate the actions of states and those of eco-
nomic agents. Its ideal is to be sufficiently clear and universal so that it doesn’t need 
an interpretation or to be supplemented with an executive body capable of discre-
tionary actions (e.g., commercial treaties). In the same way, it is possible to design 
rules favoring automatic adjustments of flux (of persons, funds, etc.). In this per-
spective, which can be compared to the German conception of Ordnungspolitik,38 
governance is essentially based on a predominantly economic legal order. States 
agree to establish a few rules of good conduct, without sharing other values or shar-
ing other purposes. The fact that a partner would disrespect moral principles (e.g., 
oppressing minorities, destroying the environment, etc.) is ultimately indifferent, as 
it does not remove or add anything to the advantage of the partnership on a strictly 
economic point of view. It is only in the case of tortious behavior (e.g., hindering 
competition, financial instability, identified market failure, depletion of natural 
resources) that it is necessary to intervene. It shares many similarities with the Law 
without States model presented above. While this approach could be applicable to 
the space sector despite its specific aspects, it should however be noted again that 
space law contains many general principles of a moral nature of which the violation 
would certainly be detrimental to developing countries and generally all nations that 
are not space powers, as noted above.
The second conception, global executive body/bodies,39 presupposes the exis-
tence of common goals, whether economic (e.g., growth, full employment, expan-
sion of trade, monetary stability) or not (e.g., peacekeeping, protection of the 
environment). The finality of governance is therefore defined on the basis of goals 
that nations set themselves to achieve together, which may have been previously 
fixed or derived from the consequences induced by their interdependence. The 
method used to achieve these objectives can be based on the same techniques as in 
the previous case, but the purpose and basis of governance are not the same. In par-
ticular, the idea of the role multilateral organizations should fill differs greatly from 
that of Ordnungspolitik. They are rather the components of a joint executive body 
dedicated to the predefined common goals, giving them an irreducible political 
nature which was absent in the first conception. This approach obviously has a basis 
in the existence of global issues calling for collective action, but it can also respond 
to a political logic. This conception of governance would seem to be easily adapted 
to space activities, considering the highly political nature of the OST, and could be 
37 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 64–65.
38 Ordnungspolitik/Ordoliberal theory holds that the state must create a proper legal environment 
for the economy and maintain a healthy level of competition (rather than just “exchange”) through 
measures that adhere to market principles. Patricia Commun, L’ordolibéralisme allemand: Aux 
sources de l’économie sociale de marché (CIRAC, 2003, 272 p.).
39 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 65–66.
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based on common goals of space exploration, utilization, and exploitation. An exec-
utive body (or multiple specialized executive bodies), whose staff would be com-
posed of experts and private actors appointed with the benediction of states, would 
allow for both the production of adapted laws and the protection of all nations’ 
interests. Furthermore, even if Ordnungspolitik has the advantage of giving a lot of 
freedom to economic actors of the space sector, it is based on a defined set of rules. 
While those rules could be drafted with the help of private actors, they could how-
ever follow to the development of the industry and technologies only with difficulty 
and constant amendment of the original treaty. On the contrary, an executive body 
would prove much more adaptable to the evolution of space activities.
8.4  Conclusion
In conclusion, even though the idea of a comprehensive set of economic rules gov-
erning space activities would certainly allow them to foster their development, the 
creation of rules of both an economic and general nature in conjunction with that of 
specialized bodies – whether they be of an executive or judicial nature – would be 
much more efficient at maintaining a balance between the needs of private actors 
and nations. A new take on the OST should therefore not abandon any of the rules 
it has set up 50 years ago but on the contrary add new ones taking into account the 
new commercial uses of outer space and implement structures capable of enforcing 
them. Obviously, none of the models of governance presented above provide the 
basis for a comprehensive scheme around which to organize the governance of 
space activities. This calls for the construction of an original and sustainable model 
made by borrowing from these different categories, in order to set up a hybrid gov-
ernance40 of the space sector. Such a model could be made up of a network of inde-
pendent authorities, each specific to a particular branch of space activities and with 
their own set of prerogatives. Meanwhile, private actors could produce recommen-
dations or noncoercive codes of conduct rather than wait for the implementation of 
general obligations and in turn inspire public regulators when their intervention is 
needed. Finally, all these actors would be subjected to the authority of a specialized 
international judicial body charged with enforcing space law and settling disputes.
However, in order to guide the elaboration of such a model of governance, a 
number of principles that respond to general objectives of efficiency, legitimacy, 
and transparency should be identified. The French Council of Economic Analysis 
proposes to select six principles: the specialization of institutions, so that citizens of 
the world could, through national and international associations and nongovern-
mental organizations, exercise a critical role on a clear basis by overseeing the way 
in which their mandates are fulfilled; political accountability, which refers to dis-
cussions on the mode of global governance and the nature of institutions; the bal-
40 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 74.
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ance between areas of expertise and associated institutions; the transparency and 
democratization of procedures which, associated with the specialization of institu-
tions, should guarantee the legitimacy of decisions; subsidiarity, that is to say that 
decisions must be taken at the most decentralized level if the transition to a higher 
level is not required in order to assure a certain level of efficiency; and finally soli-
darity, in order to mitigate market failures that prevent or delay development, com-
pensate the losers of globalization and/or ensure against the economic hazards it 
entails, and redistribute wealth to the poorest.41 The alliance of both the general 
principles of the OST, on the one hand, and of principles of governance, on the other 
hand, tempered by the use of those six principles should be enough to meet the 
objectives set out at the beginning of this analysis. To that end, the 50th anniversary 
of the Outer Space Treaty is the perfect occasion to reflect on the evolutions the 
space sector has undergone during the last 50 years and to take the necessary steps 
to adapting its rules to the twenty-first century.
41 Jacquet Pierre, Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), (n 5), 74–92.
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